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1. Introduction 
Vesuvius located near to the city of Naples in southern Italy (Fig.1), is one of 
the world’s most celebrated and dangerous volcanoes, erupting frequently during 
historic times and manifesting all the principal styles of activity. With a basal 
diameter of 12 km and rising from the Mediterranean shore to a height of 1281 m, its 
flanks support a population of around 600,000 people, with some 3 million being in 
range of its eruptive products (Kilburn and McGuire, 2001, pp. 23; Guest et al., 2003, 
pp. 25).  In addition to its fame and danger, Vesuvius is also one the most intensively 
studied volcanoes. Accounts of eruptions date from classical times and 
correspondence between Pliny the Younger and Tacitus in 79 CE
1
 constitute the first 
reliable reports of an eruption and its impact on the surrounding region, with Pompeii 
and Herculaneum being just two of many settlements destroyed.  Study of Vesuvius 
has also advanced scientific knowledge more generally and the mountain has been 
one of the ‘cradles’ of volcanological enquiry, evidenced by the creation of the 
world’s first dedicated observatory in 1841.  
 A principal finding of the United Nations International Decade for Natural 
Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) which framed disaster research in the 1990s, was that 
successful mitigation occurs when two conditions are fulfilled: first, the physical 
processes controlling an eruption are understood and, secondly, that policies of civil 
defence are, not just in place, but take into account details of place, culture and 
society (Peterson, 1996). The IDNDR was succeeded in 1990s by the International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) (United Nations, 2014) and its agenda, 
                                                 
1
 In recent years and for reasons of inclusiveness the abbreviation CE (i.e. Common Era) has replaced 
AD (i.e. Anno Domini – of the Christian era). BCE (i.e. before the Common Era) is used in place of BC 
(i.e. before Christ).  
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especially following the publication of the Hyogo Framework for Action
2
, became 
highly ‘incultured’. An understanding of place and culture is now viewed as being 
vitally important in developing policies of risk reduction. Vulnerability is the extent to 
which a society suffers damage from volcanic activity and is governed both by the 
nature of the eruption and the characteristics of the society affected, whereas 
resilience is a society’s ability to resist and recover (Gaillard, 2007, pp. 522-3; 
Manyena et al., 2011), the severity of disaster depending upon the balance between 
these two characteristics (Chester et al., 2012, pp. 77). Within the context of Hyogo, 
studies of historical disasters are important for a number of reasons (Bankoff, 2012, 
pp. 39-40) many of which are relevant to the historical eruptions of Vesuvius. 
1. The ways in which people have coped with past eruptions may challenge 
assumptions that present-day approaches are always the best (i.e. potentially valuable 
forms of indigenous coping may be uncovered). 
2. An appreciation of historical eruptions may show how responses are not isolated 
incidents, but processes represent a continuum of occurrences and responses to them. 
3. Knowledge of how societies have reacted to past eruptions provides valuable 
information on culture and, more specifically, on aspects of vulnerability and 
resilience within the region of Vesuvius. The study of past eruptions may identify 
areas, economic activities, populations and types of building that are particularly at 
risk. 
Although some aspects of culture are long-standing, the prime example 
being the framing of disasters within the prevailing religious culture of southern Italy 
(Chester et al., 2008 - see section 5.1), in general more recent historical eruptions 
                                                 
2
 The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 was promulgated following the World Conference on 
Disaster Reduction that was held in Japan in January 2005. It effectively strengthened the focus on 
society and culture already present within the ISDR. A revised blueprint will be published in 2015 
(United Nations, 2006, 2014).  
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have the greater potential to inform policies of hazard risk reduction because aspects 
of society that were important then may still be relevant today.  
 Three eruptions have occurred on Vesuvius since 1900 that have affected 
people and their activities: 1906; 1929 and 1944. The 1929 eruption was small-scale 
and affected a limited area with lava reaching the village of Terzigno (Fig. 1), and this 
was followed by lava fountaining and sustained seismic activity. The 1906 and 1944 
eruptions were far more serious, with lava flows and pyroclastic deposits causing 
deaths, injuries and major destruction. Although studied extensively from a 
volcanological perspective both at the time and subsequently (see references in: Guest 
et al., 2003; Chester et al., 2007; Scandone et al., 2008; Scandone and Giacomelli, 
2013), it is only in recent years that attention has focused on human impact, with 
major studies being published on the 1944 eruption by Pesce and Rolandi (2000) and 
Chester et al. (2007), and on 1906 by Avvisati and Casale (2006). Studying the effects 
of the 1906 eruption is possible because of the availability of: newspapers of record 
both on-line
3
 and re-published (De Lucia et al., 2006); contemporary published 
accounts some of which have also been re-issued; reports that were formerly only 
available from archives
4
; newsreel films/still photography
5
 and ephemera including 
postcards (Marasco, 2014d). This allows the in-depth study of human impacts to be 
carried out in considerably more detail than was the case even a few years ago. In 
                                                 
3
 In addition to materials in Italian newspapers, English language newspapers of record carried detailed 
– often daily - accounts of the 1906 eruption. Many research libraries have direct access to such 
sources or, alternatively, individual subscriptions may be purchased. Examples include: the New York 
Times (http://www.proquest.com/products-services/pq-hist-news.html) and The Times (London) – The 
Times Digital Archive (http://gale.cengage.co.uk/times.aspx/).   
4
 A major source is an account prepared by Lt. Col.  Sir Charles Delmé-Radcliffe, the British military 
attaché to the Italian government (see section 5.2). Until a few years ago this account was only 
available archivally (Delmé-Radcliffe, 1906), but was re-published with an introduction in 2007 
(Chester and Duncan, 2007). Another important source is Ricciardi (2009), which reproduces 
contemporary notes, letters and telegrams.      
5
 Much material is available on: (http://www.vesuvioweb.com/it/). The present paper is illustrated by 
photographs first published by H.J. Johnson-Lavis (1909) and not widely reproduced for more than a 
century.  
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some cases the effects of the eruption may now be monitored on a day-to-day or even 
hour-by-hour basis and it is data from these sources which are reported and analysed 
in this paper.  
 Before describing and analysing human responses it is necessary to discuss 
two contexts: the singularity of the region in which Vesuvius is located and the 
volcanological characteristics of the 1906 eruption.   
 
2.  The Naples Province in 1906  
Italian unification occurred in 1861 and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies with 
its capital in Naples was incorporated into the Kingdom of Italy. For administrative 
purposes Vesuvius became part of the Provincia di Napoli (Naples Province)
6
, which 
at the time of unification was the home of 951,000 people. By the time of the 1906 
eruption this figure had risen to around 1.2 million (Anon, 2014a), but this was not 
matched by any gains in prosperity and, in common with much of the rest of the 
Italian south, the Provincia di Napoli was mired in poverty. Following unification the 
economic situation of the Italian south worsened, contrasts with the north of the 
country widened and, although the relative importance of the causes are debated 
(Eckaus, 1961), the principal reasons were: a decline of fledgling manufacturing 
industries particularly in the city of Naples once protective tariffs had been removed 
after 1861; a lack of government directed development in the south, with 
manufacturing and agricultural investment growing rapidly in the north and closer ties 
between northern Italy and the major industrialised powers of Germany, France and 
the UK (King, 1987, pp. 9-12.). For the region of Campania which includes Naples 
Province: index values of per-capita income fell from 96 in 1861 to 91 (Italy as a 
                                                 
6
 The boundaries of the Provincia di Napoli changed on several occasions in the twentieth century. 
They were, however, unchanged from 1861 to 1926. 
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whole 100); in 1861 the south contributed 40% of the nation’s wealth (i.e. value 
added), by 1901 this had fallen to about 30% (Rinaldi et al., 2011); in 1905 some 12% 
of northern agriculture was irrigated, the figure in the south being less than 2% and 
the impoverished agricultural sector in the south became even more unproductive, 
increasing its share of the working population from 54% in 1871 to over 60% on the 
eve of the First World War without any concomitant increase in output. Over the 
same time period, industrial employment in the south fell from 24%, to under 22% of 
the workforce (King, 1987, pp. 10-11). One manifestation of poverty and stagnation 
was a major flow of migrants to other European countries and especially to the USA, 
and between 1880 and 1914 some 7 million Italians emigrated many of whom came 
from the south (King, 1987, pp. 10-15). 
The plight of the Naples Province was not just economic, but in common with 
the rest of the south was social as well. In the years before 1914, illiteracy rates in the 
south were nearly 60%, many farmers especially those with small plots and/or 
insecure tenancies lived at a subsistence level and infectious diseases killed many 
people every year
7
 (King, 1987; Snowdon, 2002). Although organised crime was 
present in the form of the notorious Camorra, the reputation of the region as one 
mired in delinquency (Chester et al., 2007) has been questioned by some 
contemporary historians with John Dickie arguing that ‘the concept of the south was 
(re-invented following unification) and a massive accretion of real and symbolic 
problems rapidly began to shape that concept as a national concern’ (Dickie, 1999, 
pp.143). Views were moulded by northern ruling elites and frequently involved 
overstated views of the south as a region devastated by organised crime (Dickie, 
1999, pp. 146). 
                                                 
7
 Major cholera epidemics affected Naples in 1884 and 1910-11 (Snowdon, 2002).  
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Politically the early years of the twentieth century up to the First World War 
were dominated by governments led by Giovanni Giolitti (1842-1928), who served as 
Prime Minister for most of the period
8
. Known as the Giolittian Era (Bosworth, 1983; 
King, 1987), these were years of economic advance in Italy as a whole – though not in 
the south – and progress was secured by monetary stability, protectionism and 
government support for industry. The Giolittian Era was one in which Italy was on 
the cusp of modernity, with interventionist policies touching more aspects of everyday 
life for the first time (e.g. support of low income housing, old age and disability 
pensions and support of workers’ cooperatives) and, as will be discussed in section 
5.2, this progressive political climate meant that responses to the 1906 emergency 
involved the State to a much greater extent than had been case in previous eruptions. 
In responses to the 1906 eruption both pre-industrial and industrial features may be 
recognised.
9
      
 
3. The 1906 eruption 
3.1 The historical eruptions of Vesuvius 
The 1906 event was preceded by over 1,800 years of recorded volcanic history, with 
the 79 CE eruption being, not only the first recorded event, but also the most 
explosive (Scandone et al., 1993). Before 79 CE Vesuvius was not recognised as 
active and between 79 CE and the 472  CE (Pollena) eruption there are few records of 
                                                 
8
  Giolitti served as Prime Minister from: 15/5/92 - 15/12/93; 3/11/03 - 12/3/05; 29/5/06 – 
11/12/09; 30/3/11 - 21/3/14 and 15/6/20 - 4/7/21.  The Prime Minister at the time of the eruption was 
Sidney Sonnino who only served from February 8
th
 to May 29
th
 1906. He was in every sense a 
politician of the Giolittian Era, and Giolitti himself returned to government after May 29
th
 (Anon, 
2014d). Italy was a constitutional monarchy and the King at the time of the eruption was Victor 
Emmanuel III, who reigned until 1946.  
9
 The terms pre-industrial and industrial were introduced by Gilbert White (1974, pp. 5) to describe 
characteristics ways in which human responses are related to level of economic development. In pre-
industrial societies the emphasis is focused on responses that are, inter alia: predominantly locally- 
based, involving a wide range of actions; which are flexible and emphasise harmonisation with nature, 
action being taken by individuals and/or local groups. In contrast, industrial responses involve: the 
State to a much greater degree; emphasise technological control over nature and adopt more uniform 
responses (see also Chester et al., 2005)   
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activity, but by using the documents which are available together with 
archaeomagnetic dating and tephrostratigraphic data (Rolandi et al., 1998; Cioni et al., 
2008),  Principe et al. (2004) were able to produce a chronology of eruptions from 79 
CE to 1631. Between 79 CE and 472 CE, there was a major eruption in 203 CE, plus 
a number of smaller events, but there was no evidence of lava having been erupted 
from locations outside the Monte Somma caldera (Fig. 2). From 787 CE to 1571 
(Brown, 2012) activity was marked by mixed explosive and effusive eruptions and a 
number of lava flows reached the sea, but after 1571 there was a prolonged period of 
quiescence and the inhabitants of the region once again forgot that they were living on 
an active volcano, their reverie being disturbed by the large sub-plinian eruption of 
1631 which killed around 4,000 people (Rosi et al., 1993). There followed a well 
recorded phase of continuous summit activity until 1944 (Chester et al., 2007). This 
was dominated by strombolian activity, with eruptions involving: lava being emitted 
from the upper flanks of the volcano, from time to time flowing over the crater rim; 
and occasionally from parasitic cones that developed on fractures located on the 
middle flanks, which produced flows that reached inhabited areas (Brown, 2012). In 
all cases eruptions were usually accompanied by explosions and fire fountains. A 
number of workers, such as Alfano and Freidlaender (1929) and more recently Carta 
et al. (1981), have recognised cyclicity in this eruptive behaviour with episodes of 
mild strombolian activity and lava effusion ending with violent final eruptions 
followed by several years of repose. Arrighi et al. (2001) in a detailed study of violent 
strombolian/subplinian eruptions since 1631, showed that not all violent eruptions 
were followed by periods of repose and many eruptions identified as final did not 
show evidence of phreatomagmatic character required by the cyclic activity model. 
Scandone et al. (1993) and Arrighi et al. (2001) question the existence of cycles of 
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activity. Further research by Scandone et al. (2008, pp. 169) enabled them to argue 
‘that major eruptions do not represent the culmination of a period of activity’.  
 Scandone et al. (2008, pp. 169, 172) propose that the eruptive behaviour of 
Vesuvius between 1631 and 1944 is characterised by the following states: (1) normal 
strombolian activity; (2) slow lava effusion and (3) rapid discharge of lava followed 
by violent strombolian eruptions (paroxysms) sometimes followed by periods of 
repose. States 1 and 2 may occur simultaneously and occur for years as persistent 
activity. State 3, violent strombolian eruptions or paroxysms, last from hours to days 
and are characterised by either major explosions or eruption of high velocity lava 
flows which may reach the lower flanks of the volcano. These are followed by high 
lava fountains which, if the eruption rate is sufficiently high, may lead to crater 
collapse sometimes accompanied by phreatomagmatic activity. 
 
3.2 Events of 1906       
 The 1906 eruption was observed by scores of reporters and many scientists, 
who included five leading geoscientists of the day:  Raffaele Vittorio Matteucci
10
, the 
Director of the Osservatorio Vesuviano; Giuseppe Mercalli
11
; the doyen of French 
volcanologists, Antoine Lacroix
12
 and two anglophone expatriates, Henry Johnston-
                                                 
10
 Raffaele Vittorio Matteucci (1846-1909) was a distinguished geologist, volcanologist, who authored 
two major works on volcanology:  Fisica delle lave fluenti (1898) and État actuel des volcans de 
l'Europe méridionale (1899) (Anon, 2014g).  
11
 Giuseppe Mercalli (1850-1914) a priest/scientist, who as well as devising the earthquake intensity 
scale that carries his name, was also at the University of Naples from 1892. From 1911 to 1914, when 
he was killed in a house fire, he was Director of the Osservatorio Vesuviano (Anon, 2014b).  
12
 Antoine Lacroix (1863-1948) Professor of Mineralogy at the Jardin des Plantes in Paris (from 1893) 
and Director of the mineralogical laboratory (from 1896) at the École des Hautes Études. He is best 
known for his research on the Martinique eruption of 1902. Later he was president of the volcanology 
section of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUCC) (Campbell-Smith and Margerie, 
E. de, 1952)  
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Lavis
13
 from the UK and the American Frank Perret, who worked with Director 
Matteucci at the observatory during the euption.
14
 Only Matteucci, Mercalli and 
Perret were directly involved in handling the emergency (Ricciardi et al., 2006).   
The eruption of 1872 produced lava that covered, respectively, around a third 
and a quarter of the villages of Massa di Somma and San Sebastiano (Fig. 2) and 
ended with strong explosive activity in the central crater (Palmieri, 1873). During this 
eruption explosive activity caused damage to cultivated land and housing. Nine 
people were killed and eleven were injured (Ricciardi, 2009). The latter part of the 
19
th
 century and the beginning of the 20
th
 century was characterised by slow effusion 
of lava from the summit cone. This changed in April 1905 with more explosive 
activity developing in the summit cone punctuated by a phase in which small volumes 
of lava were erupted (Mastrolorenzo et al., 1993). The 1906 eruption began on April 
4
th
 with the volcano erupting a column of dark ash and on the night of 4
th
/5
th
 lava 
began to be erupted from a vent at 800 m asl on the southern side of the cone 
(Mercalli, 1906; Perret, 1924). Between April 5
th
 and 7
th
 lava vents opened along a 
2000 m long fracture (Acocella et al., 2006) downslope to the south, and also to the 
east down to a height of 600 m (Mastrolorenzo et al., 1993). The easternmost vent, 
Bosco Cognoli, was erupting lava on April 6
th
 at a velocity of 6 ms
-1
 (Perret, 1924). 
During April 6
th
 and 7
th
 lava reached to within 500 m of Boscotrecase and a flow to 
the east stopped just short of Terzigno (Fig. 3, 4 and 5). On the evening of April 7
th
, 
Perret describes great geyser jets and activity building to a condition of extraordinary 
violence accompanied by continuous seismic activity. Perret describes the fountains 
                                                 
13
 Henry Johnston-Lavis (1856-1914) was a medical practitioner and volcanologist who was Professor 
of Volcanology at the Royal University of Naples from 1892. Johnston-Lavis published extensively on 
Vesuvius and its eruptions (Kirk, 2014).  
14
 Frank Alvord Perret (1867-1943) was an American inventor and engineer who worked with Thomas 
Edison and retired to the Neapolitan coast in 1903 because of ill-health. He subsequently studied 
Vesuvius in particular the eruption of 1906 (Hoffer, 1982). 
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as having trajectories inclined to the NE and depositing large quantities of tephra on 
the towns of Somma Vesuviana, Ottaviano and San Giuseppe (Fig.1). This 
accumulation of tephra caused roofs to collapse including that of the church of San 
Giuseppe which led to more than 100 people being killed (Scandone et al., 2008, see 
section 4.1). Fresh outpouring of lava on the night of the 7
th
/8
th
 sent a flow through 
the outskirts of Boscotrecase (Oratorio district) on the 8
th
 and this was travelling so 
quickly that it killed several people who were unable to escape (Scandone et al., 2008, 
see section 4.1).  The flow cut the Circumvesuviana railway in two places and came 
to a halt just short of Torre Annunziata. Vigorous foutaining ceased at 3.30 am on 
April 8
th
 (Bertagnini et al., 1991) leading to what was described by Perret as the 
'intermediate gas phase' and by the afternoon a  column with a height of 13 km had 
been generated. It is thought that the vigorous discharge of the eruptive column 
caused an in-rush of air from all sides of the volcano and windows which faced away 
from the crater, were broken in Ottaviano and San Guiseppe (Hobbs, 1906).  The 
products of activity, that followed the changes that occurred in the early hours of 
Monday morning, showed hydromagmatic features. The ‘increase in the degree of 
fragmentation of the juvenile component together with the marked increase of the 
lithic component…emphasise the repeated occurrence of magma-water interaction’ 
(Bertagnini et al., 1991, pp. 517).  In phase 3 the gas/pyroclast column was 
characterised by huge quantities of steam and a high lithic/juvenile ratio and 
Bertagnini et al. argue that this resulted from hydromagmatic activity through 
interaction with the geothermal system. After the April 8
th
 activity declined, but large 
volumes of grey ash were erupted from the central crater and the direction of tephra 
dispersal moved to a more westerly direction reaching Puglia. Ash was also, deposited 
to the east on Capri, Ischia, Pozzuoli and Naples (Bertagnini et al., 1991; 
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Mastrolorenzo et al., 1993 – Figs. 6 and 7). The eruption ended on April 21st 
according to Mercalli (1906). 
Destruction continued after the eruption finished. Heavy rainfall on April 27
th
 
/28
th
, on the night of May 17
th
/18
th
 and on May 20
th
/21
st
, led to re-mobilisation of 
unconsolidated tephra mantling the flanks of the volcano as lahars (Mercalli, 1906). 
These damaged bridges on the Circumvesuviana railway, caused further devastation 
to agricultural land and badly affected several villages (Scarth, 2009, Table 1, Figs. 1 
and 3).  
Details of the eruption are summarised in Table 1 and the extent of its eruptive 
products are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Although Table 1 is self-explanatory in the 
main, one point requires further discussion. Although the table makes some mention 
of earthquakes, volcanic tremors were a frequent occurrence with felt earthquakes 
being experienced: over a wide area on April 5
th 
(Anon, 1906a); on April 7
th
, from 
Boscoreale along the coast to the southeast for a distance of 24 km (Anon, 1906b); on 
April 8
th
, a strong earthquake was felt at the summit at 12.37 h followed by seismic 
swarms (Mastrolorenzo et al., 1993, pp. 220) and in Naples windows were broken and 
walls cracked (Anon, 1906c); on April 9
th
, when a seismographic record, presumably 
from the observatory is noted (Anon, 1906d) and  on April 10
th
, when Nola, Somma 
and Ottaviano were affected (Anon, 1906e). Apart from broken windows, cracked 
walls and the shock caused to the inhabitants on April 8
th
, volcanic earthquakes do not 
appear to have been a major cause of damage during the 1906 eruption (see section 6), 
although Hoffer (1982, pp. 173) claims that the Monte Oliveto market collapse (Table 
1) was hastened because its structure was weakened by seismic activity. 
 
 
4. The Extent of the Losses  
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Inaccurate reporting is a problem which has dogged attempts to reconstruct the 
impacts of eruptions, both generally (Tanguy et al., 1998) and more specifically in the 
context of the Italian volcanoes (Duncan et al., 1996; Chester et al., 2007). Eyewitness 
accounts are often exaggerated, or even false and this is reflected in contemporary 
newspaper reports, especially those close in time to the events being described. For 
instance, one account in the New York Times dated April 9
th
 (Anon, 1906c, pp. 1) 
describes events on March 8 (Table 1) and contains three exaggerated statements: ‘no 
trace remains of Boscotrecase’; Torre dell Annunziata is almost surrounded by lava 
and the observatory had been destroyed. Fortunately there are usually many 
observations of the same events and these may be compared to correct or eliminate 
inaccuracies and, furthermore, newspapers of record frequently correct initial 
statements in later reportage.  
Following the 1906 eruption a prestigious Central Relief Committee 
(Comitato Centrale di Soccorso) was established under the chairmanship of the Duca 
d’ Aosta15 which took great care to enumerate the deaths, injuries and damage to land, 
property and economy. Later its findings were published (Anon, 1908a) and it is these 
data, together with information in Anon (1906f), Delmé-Radcliffe (1906), Sabatini 
(1906), Nazzaro (1997), Avvisati and Casale (2006), Marasco (2014 a-g) and the 
other sources noted below, which form the basis of the summaries presented in 
sections 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
4.1 Deaths, injuries and homelessness  
 Some 216 people were killed by the effects of ash, lapilli and asphyxiation, 
112 were seriously injured and around 34,000 people were rendered homeless. Of the 
                                                 
15
 The Duca d’Aosta (1869-1931) was a cousin of  King Vittorio Emanuele III and one of Italy’s most 
distinguished military figure both before and during the First World War (Anon, 2014d). 
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deaths, 212 occurred in the Province of Naples and 4 in the contiguous Province of 
Caserta, which at the time extended to the north and north east of Vesuvius. This 
pattern of losses reflects the distribution of airfall ash and lapilli, with the greatest 
mortality and morbidity being in San Giuseppe where 125 met their deaths and 107 
were injured as a result of tephra fall (mainly from roof collapses) (Fig. 8). The 
mortality figure comprises 116 people whose bodies were indentified plus a further 9 
unidentified corpses which were recorded as missing. Avvisati and Casale (2006) note 
that many of the deceased were drawn from the same families, a situation repeated in 
Ottaviano where 78 people died and 40 were injured. At least 105 of the deaths at San 
Giuseppe occurred as a result of collapse of the roof of the church of the Orotorio 
della Santa Spirito (Table 1). In both villages mortality statistics were skewed 
towards the young and their often elderly carers. The roof collapse at Monte Oliveto 
market killed 11 and injured 30, and other instances of mortality and morbidity were 
spread across the area affected by the tephra (Fig. 3), with the effects of the ash 
diminishing with increasing distance
16
. The only deaths directly attributable to lava 
flows occurred at Boscotrecase. Scandone et al. (2008) refer to 7 deaths and Scarth 
(2009) and other sources to three elderly men who died when lava invaded the church 
of S. Anna in the Oratorio quarter (Table 2).   
 
4.2 Economic losses 
 Losses are summarised in Table 2 and in the immediate aftermath of the 
eruption the region’s economy was devastated (Avvisati and Casale, 2006, pp. 235). 
Although as argued in section 2 the Provincia di Napoli in common with much of the 
                                                 
16
 In the Province of Naples: 2 died at Resina (now Ercolano); 2 at Somma Vesuviana; 2 at Torre del 
Greco and 1 at Saviano. In Caserta Province: 2 died at San Gennaro di Palma; and 1 each at Saviano, 
Piazzolla di Nola (Avvistati and Casale, 2006, pp. 37-41). These figures, together with the 116, 78 and 
11 killed respectively in San Giuseppe, Ottaviano and Naples, produces the overall death toll of 216 
from ash, lapilli and asphyxiation.    
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south had a relatively low per-capita income, its large population meant that it was a 
vital element in the Italian economy, with the city of Naples being at the time Italy’s 
most populous city.
17
 One estimate is that damage to productive land alone cost 60 
million lire (Nazzaro, 1997, pp. 202-3; Avvisati and Casale, 2006, pp. 235)
18
. Actual 
economic costs were much higher than this because there were, not only additional 
direct losses (i.e. to housing and infrastructure), but also a whole raft of indirect costs 
which even today are rarely calculated following major disasters. These included, 
inter alia: lost production; business interruption; demand reduction; the costs of 
emergency responses/clean-up operations and the negative effects of deaths and 
injuries on the economically productive cohort of the region (Rose, 2007; Kousky, 
2012).  Even 60 million lira equates to some 2% of national government expenditure 
and ca.0.32% of Gross Domestic Product or GDP
19
 (see section 6. for further 
discussion). 
Although data on the total area of land affected and the proportions that were 
permanently or only temporarily damaged vary (see: Delmé-Radcliffe, 1906, pp. 5; 
Nazzaro, 1997, pp. 205; Avvisati and Casale, 2006, pp.230, 235), sources are agreed 
that the greatest damage was to cropland, orchards, vineyards and chestnut forests 
concentrated in the local authorities area (comuni)  of Ottaviano, Somma Vesuviana, 
Nola, Palma Campania, Naples and Lauro (north east of San Giuseppe), with each 
                                                 
17
 In 1901 the population of Naples was just over 621,000, Milan 538, 470, Rome 422,441 and Turin 
329,691. 
18
 Calculating how much 60 million lira (12 million US $) would represent today is difficult because 
values may be converted into a number of measures using, for example, the consumer price index, or 
skilled/unskilled wages or a bundle of consumer or government purchases. A rough value of the 
present day buying power of 1 US $ in 1906, is 24 US $ in 2014 (US Inflation Calculator, 2014).  
19
 Italy: per-capita GDP 1905/6 was 563 lira; the population of Italy 1906 was 33.5 m and, therefore, 
GDP was 18, 861 m lira. Between 1870 and 1913, government expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
varied on a rising trend, from ca.14 to ca.17% (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000, pp. 6). Assuming 16%, 
then government expenditure represents ca. 3,018 million lira. The minimal cost of the eruption (i.e. 60 
million lira), equates to around 2% of expenditure or 0.32% national GDP. In an earlier report and 
using incomplete data (Chester and Duncan, 2007), estimated a figure of 16% of GDP. This is an 
overestimate which is now withdrawn.  
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having more 2,700 ha of damaged land (Fig. 1 and Table 2). Only land covered by 
lava was semi-permanently sterilised, and the reclamation of ash, lapilli and lahar 
affected land took varying lengths of time depending on the depth of the deposits and 
the labour and financial resources available to farmers and the State (see section 5.). 
 
5. Responding to the emergency 
5.1 The role of the individual family and community 
When studying the nineteenth century eruptions of Etna (Chester et al., 2012), 
we noted that panic defined as ‘irrational, groundless or hysterical flight that is carried 
out with complete disregard for others’ (der Heide, 2004, pp. 342), was rarely a 
feature of responses. The same was generally the case during the 1906 eruption of 
Vesuvius. Although many newspaper accounts - in particular those penned by 
correspondents from the United Kingdom and USA - make reference to ‘panic’ in 
most cases this is clearly colloquial usage of the word because reading the reports in 
detail shows  that people, though often frightened and apprehensive, remained rational 
and concerned for others. For instance towards the start of the eruption the New York 
Times begins its report by claiming that people are ‘in a state of panic’, yet then goes 
on to give examples of rational behaviour which included: in Portici the inhabitants 
cleared land in a ‘effort to lessen the danger from fire’; people used umbrellas to 
provide albeit rudimentary self-protection and judiciously seeking ‘safety in flight’ 
(Anon, 1906h, pp. 1),  taking care to remove possessions (Anon, 1906i) and in some 
cases their furniture as well (Anon, 1906d). In Ottaviano the most severely affected 
village, people are described as protecting themselves with mattresses, blankets and 
even placing iron cooking pots on their heads (Avvisati and Casale, 2006, pp. 37-41). 
The only exceptions seem to have been in Naples towards the start of the eruption on 
April 8 when people ‘rushed to the streets in terror, many persons crying: ‘the 
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Madonna has forsaken us! the end has come’ and amongst prisoners held in local jails 
who rioted because they felt trapped (Anon, 1906c, pp. 1). Within two days 
inhabitants are described as calmly clearing ash from roofs (Anon, 1906e) and, once 
moved to Naples, the penal insurrections that occurred on Tuesday 10
th
 and 
Wednesday 11
th
 were both small scale and easily contained by the authorities (Anon, 
1906l).   
Although evacuation of affected villages was planned and executed by the  
authorities (section 5.2), one feature typical of pre-industrial responses (section 2.) is 
self-help and this featured prominently in 1906. Numerous people without any 
prompting left their homes to seek safety in other locations that they perceived to be 
more secure, with many seeking refuge at the coast, in Naples and even as far away as 
Caserta which is located ca.40 km north of Naples (Anon, 1906h, 1906i). 
Spontaneous evacuation was noted in San Giorgio, Portici, Resina
20
, Torre del Greco 
and many other settlements (Anon, 1906m). Contemporary commentators note (Anon, 
1906c; 1906l; 1906m, 1906n; Delmé-Radcliffe, 1906) that many of those who 
remained in affected settlements sought shelter in churches and this was the principal 
reason for the deaths in San Giuseppe which were caused by the collapse of the roof 
of the Chiesa dell’Oratorio dello Spirito Santo (section 4.1 and Tables 1 & 2).    
  Framing disasters in religious terms is long-standing in southern Italy, was a 
prominent response in 1906 and, given this worldview, fleeing to places of worship 
was an understandable response. It was well known at the time that conventionally 
constructed public buildings - in particular churches - were potentially unsafe because 
of their susceptibility to tectonic earthquakes, volcanic-earthquakes and tephra fall. 
For instance: the 1887 earthquake (maximum intensity VIII MCS) centred on the 
                                                 
20
 Since 1969 Resina has been known as Ercolano. 
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riviera coast of southern France and north western Italy occurred on Ash Wednesday 
when  people were at Mass and many of the in excess of  600 victims died in churches 
(Kozák and Čermák, 2010, pp. 183); on Etna and following loss of life in previous 
eruptions, churches were closed in 1883 and 1892 (Chester et al., 2012) and as 
recently as 1905, the Calabrian earthquake (estimated magnitude 6.2-7.9) killed more 
than 550 people many of whom died in their beds because of building collapse (Tinti 
and Piatanesi, 2001).  In 1906, some priests who were only too aware of the dangers  
would not open their churches to the public - this being the case in Torre 
dell’Annunziata (Anon, 1906k), but there were several recorded instances of people 
forcing their way into churches and taking possession of statues and pictures of saints 
(Anon, 1906m). In fact in San Giuseppe one of the priests, Don Giuseppe D’ 
Ambrosio, knew that the roof was unsafe, tried to dissuade people from crowding into 
the building but in the end agreed to remain to celebrate Mass and, displaying the 
statue of S. Antonio, hoped for a miracle (Delmé-Radcliffe, 1906, pp. 3; Marasco, 
2014d).  In fact despite the deaths a miracle was claimed by some parishioners 
because a statue of S. Anna was still standing and undamaged after the roof collapsed 
(Anon, 1906m).   
The religious devotion of the people, which in some cases overcame the 
normal human desire for self-protection, was harshly criticised by observers at the 
time particularly those from overseas, who neither shared nor sympathised with what 
has been termed southern Italy popular Catholicism (Chester et al., 2007)  
‘Many people were killed because they had collected in churches to pray under weak 
and ill-constructed roofs, instead of getting on them to clean them (since), even during 
the heaviest part of the fall, persons could move about if they covered their heads and 
shoulders with pillows, tables or other improvised shields’ (Johnston-Lavis, quoted by 
Scarth, 2009, pp. 264). 
 
‘During the eruption, beyond running away, the utmost the people did to help 
themselves was to carry about images of their saints in front of the lava in 
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processions, which largely consisted of  women and girls, with their hair loosened, 
wailing and singing. This strikes the feminine spectator as very “touching’ and 
picturesque, but is a really pitiful exhibition of superstitions, a mixture of vanity and 
hysteria on the part of the women and indolence and ignorance in the men. It is also 
deplorably unpractical’ (Delmé-Radcliffe, 1906, pp. 6). 
 
 Although these comments reflect religious sectarianism and on the part of 
Delmé-Radcliffe the misogynistic attitudes of the early twentieth century career 
soldier, they do reveal one aspect of the religious response that to the authors’ 
knowledge is unique to this Italian eruption. In previous reports (Chester et al., 2007, 
2008, 2012) we have argued that across a range of historic disasters in Italy victims 
displayed what we have termed ‘parallel practice’21 i.e. believing on the one hand that 
God controls human destiny and must be propitiated through the performance of 
elaborate religious rituals but, on the other, being prepared to adopt practical measures 
to protect self, family and community, and to co-operate with the authorities. As will 
be discussed in section 5.2, there is no evidence to suggest fatalism on the part of the 
inhabitants or any resistance to State and/or international help, but the fact remains 
that some aspects of pre-industrial self-help were impeded in the ways noted by 
Henry Johnston-Lavis, although people did help themselves to some extent and 
particularly at the start of the eruption and before the army arrived.   
 Sunday 8
th
 April 1906 was Palm Sunday, Good Friday fell on the 13
th
 and 
Easter Sunday on the 15
th
, and the eruption coincided with the most important week in 
the Christian year for which elaborate rituals had already been planned (Anon, 
1906o).  The principal characteristics of southern Italian popular Catholicism are 
summarised in Table 3 and during the eruption were expressed in several ways. There 
are numerous accounts of the procession of saintly relicts, statues and images and the 
                                                 
21
 In hazard studies believing in two mutually incompatible explanations, or maintaining one opinion 
but acting contrary to it, is sometimes referred to as cognitive dissonance. However in religious studies 
and psychology cognitive dissonance has a more restricted definition (Carroll, 1990, pp. 123-4). For 
this reason parallel practice is used in this paper.  
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widespread use of intercessory prayer through the saints, not only for God’s mercy, 
but also for miraculous interventions. Indeed these devotional expressions were 
common features of virtually every town and village to varying degrees, ranging from 
prayers to saints said in church and home to major outdoor processions (Anon, 1906a; 
Marasco, 2014d). Generally these religious rites were legitimised by the participation 
of priests and in some cases bishops, although some of the more heterodox 
expressions of devotion were resisted by the clergy.  For instance the Cardinal 
Archbishop of Naples, Cardinal Giuseppe Prisco
22
 locally born like many of his 
priests, was initially reluctant to allow a clergy-led procession of the holy image of S. 
Gennaro through the streets of Naples, but had to relent following the occupation of 
his cathedral and the possibility of civil commotion (Anon, 1906l). On the night of 
April 7
th
 when the town of Boscotrecase (Fig. 1) was threatened by lava, the parish 
priest initially resisted the parade of a sacred image of the Madonna to the flow front 
and there was a move to close the church, but under intense public pressure Don 
Carmine Russo was forced to compromise and agree to the procession of a rough 
wooden cross and a statue of S. Anna. The people believed that this action limited the 
damage to the town (Marasco, 2014d) though, as noted in section 4.1, on the next day 
lava entered the town and at least 3 people were killed, while in Torre Annunziata a 
sacred image was claimed to have miraculously halted the lava’s advance (Marasco, 
2014c; Anon 1906k).  Following the eruption churches were crowded with 
worshippers giving thanks for the danger passed and praying for the repose of souls in 
elaborate requiem masses (Anon, 1906o).  
 In section 2, it was argued that crime and delinquency were and are aspects of 
the local cultural mileau of the region that have often been over-emphasised by 
                                                 
22
 Giuseppe Antonio Ermenegildo Prisco (1833-1923) – Archbishop of Naples (1898-1923). He was 
born on Boscotrecase. (Anon, 2014f) 
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outside observers and, although there were incidents of crime, the general impression 
is one of social cohesion and the mutual sharing of suffering with no systematic 
breakdown in law and order. There were isolated incidents of looting in Boscotrecase 
(Anon, 1906k) and instances of misappropriating of money collected during religious 
processions (Anon, 1906l), but this is balanced by people working together to clear 
ash (Anon, 1906h). First aid was provided by villagers for the victims at Ottaviano 
(Avvisati and Casale, 2006), charity kitchens were established in several villages 
(Anon, 1906j) and contemporary photographs show communities coming together to 
remove ash from roofs.  
 
5.2 The role of the State and other national and international responders 
 
 The last major eruption in Italy prior to 1906 was of Etna in 1892 and, 
although State-based responses were evident (Chester et al., 2012), they were far less 
comprehensive than those in 1906. In part this is explained by relative magnitudes of 
the two events and the number of people affected, the sub-plinian 1906 event 
dwarfing the impact of the 1892 eruption of Etna (Branca and Del Carlo, 2005), but 
the progressive interventionist political climate of the Giolittian Era (see section 2.) 
was also highly significant with resources, not just being deployed by the State but 
also by non-governmental organisations - especially the Catholic Church - in ways 
that had never featured to the same extent in previous responses to volcanic disasters. 
Although in Southern Italy and Sicily, State control over disaster management is often 
dated from the time of the 1908 Messina earthquake (Dickie, 1999) and, in the case of 
volcanic eruptions to 1928, when the Fascist government led by Benito Mussolini 
virtually monopolised the response to a major flank eruption of Etna which destroyed 
the large agricultural village of Mascali (Duncan et al., 1996; Chester et al., 1999), the 
events of 1906 showed a major effort on the part of central government in Rome to 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 22 
respond effectively to the crisis.
23
 The 1906 eruption also had an international 
dimension with moral and financial support and, indeed, scientific expertise coming 
from a wide range of countries, particularly those with large Italian diaspora 
populations (see section 6.).     
 The eruption began with an initial phase of lava emission between April 4
th
 
and 8
th
 (Table 1), and it was only from the 8
th
 that tephra fall and lava advance caused 
major problems for the people of the region. This meant that local leaders had time to 
prepare, and there are numerous reports of action being taken by the authorities during 
this early phase of eruption.  These actions included: the use of artillery 
wagons/limbers, the railways and, in the case of coastal settlements such as Torre 
Annunziata, ships to evacuate people to safety (Anon, 1906b, 1906c, 1906i). The long 
established role in Italy of the police, Carabinieri (i.e. military police) and troops 
stationed locally to maintain order and assist the civil power in times of disaster 
(Chester et al., 2012), featured prominently (Anon 1906c, 1906i). From April 5
th
 both 
military and Carabinieri units in the area were reinforced and on April 7
th
 the Duca d’ 
Aosta ordered military engineers to erect barriers and dig ditches in what proved to be 
a vain attempt to arrest the advance of lava on Boscotrecase (Anon 1906b). By April 
8
th
 an estimated 10,000 evacuees had been accommodated in Torre Annunciata 
(Anon, 1906i) and in Naples by late afternoon on April 8
th
 the military had issued 
                                                 
23
 This was despite the fact that the government at the time was preoccupied by a number of serious 
domestic and international issues. These included, inter alia: various social conflicts; the government 
crisis that brought Sydney Sonnino into office for a few months; arguments over the nationalisation of 
railways; the Algerciras Conference; trade agreements with Ethiopia and arguments with France and 
the UK over spheres of influence in Ethiopia. The Algerciras Conference was potentially very serious 
for the maintenance of European peace and concerned a Franco/German dispute over Morocco. The 
Italian government did useful work in helping to craft a compromise (Bosworth, 1983, pp 64-5). 
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ca.10,000 rations, had ordered further supplies and placed ships on alert should 
further evacuation be required (Anon, 1906i).
24
   
 The effects of the sub-plinian phase of the eruption which began during the 
night of April 8
th
/9
th
 (Tables 1 and 2), could neither be managed by the provincial 
authorities, the comuni
25
, nor by the police, local Carabinieri and troops they had at 
their disposal. Additional personnel and far greater central direction were required and 
the government in Rome acted quickly. By April 9
th
 the population of Naples was 
swollen by many thousands of refugees, ca.15,000 had reached Castellamare di 
Stabia, on the coast to the south of Torre Annuziata (Fig. 1; Anon, 1906m) and great 
efforts were devoted to: feeding evacuees, often using field kitchens;  distributing 
bread and sheltering people in barracks and other accommodation available to the 
State (Anon, 1906k). Gradually larger contingents of troops arrived, soldiers and 
sailors were ordered ashore from ships anchored in the Bay of Naples and fire-fighters 
were drafted in from as far away as Palermo in Sicily (Anon, 1906k).  It soon became 
apparent that some local leaders and officials were insufficiently skilled and/or 
committed to handling an emergency of this severity and urgent action, including 
summary dismissal, had to be taken. For instance, the Prefetto (i.e. prefect)
26
 of 
Naples Province had no hesitation in relieving the Sindaco (i.e. mayor) of San 
Giuseppe of his duties, because he fled the town when it was faced with danger and 
without informing his superiors (Anon, 1906a). The monarch also upbraided a priest 
for leaving his parish for which he held the cure of souls (Anon, 1906k) and there 
were cases where military telegraphers had to replace civilian operators who deserted 
their stations (Delmé-Radcliffe, 1906, pp. 7). A more common response was the 
                                                 
24
 This report from The Times (London) originates in Rome and is dated April 9
th
. It makes used of both 
its own reportage and extensive quotations from from the April 7
th
 edition Neapolitan  paper, Il 
Mattino. It notes the positive leaderships shown by Cardinal Prisco and the Duca d’ Aosta. 
25
 Comuni are townships or municipalities. 
26
 The representative of the central government in a province.  
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imposition of direct rule, and authority in the comuni of Ottaviano, San Giuseppe, 
Resina, Somma Vesuviana, Torre Annunciata and Torre Del Greco was temporarily 
vested in prefectural commissioners.  
In 1906 motorised transport was limited, earth-moving equipment absent and 
the principal requirement at the height of the eruption was for large drafts of labour to 
clear roofs, roads, distribute food and restore rail and telegraphic communications. 
This was achieved primarily through the deployment of large bodies of troops, and 
this aspect of the State response was the subject of detailed independent evaluation by 
the British military attaché, Lt. Col. Sir Charles Delmé-Radcliffe.
27
 Table 4 details the 
military response and Colonel Delmé-Radcliffe’s expert evaluation is very positive, 
with his report drawing attention in particular to:- 
a. High quality planning at short notice on the part of the Duca d’Aosta and his staff 
officers.  
b. The ready supply of food. From the Naples depot alone this amounted to 32,000 
people being fed with ca.0.64 kg per day
28
 between April 8
th
 and April 14
th
. Similar 
amounts were distributed by depots in Nola and Nocera (Table 4), but Delmé-
Radcliffe was not able to obtain detailed figures from these centres.  
c. The discipline and commitment shown by the troops, under very difficult 
conditions.  
                                                 
27
 Although Delmé-Radcliffe’s report contains much valuable information on the nature of the eruption, 
its principal aim was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Italian military in handling a logistically 
complex operation. Lt. Col. (later Brigadier-General) Sir Charles Delmé-Radcliffe (1864-1937) was  
primarily a staff officer and an excellent linguist, who published extensively on military and scientific 
topics. His posting to Rome was the highlight of his career and he formed friendships, not only with the 
major political and military figure, but also with the monarch. Before the First World War the position 
of Italy within the strategic alliances of Europe was important to Britain and the role of military attaché 
was a posting of crucial important. In 1906, Italy was officially allied to Germany and Austria, and the 
United Kingdom worked hard to achieve a re-alignment. This was ultimately successful and in 1915 
Italy entered the First World War on the side of the Allies (Chester and Duncan, 2007).  
 
28
 There is an arithmetical error in Delmé-Radcliff’s original report. The correction is given in Chester 
and Duncan (2007).  
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These points were also made by other outside observers (Crawford, 1906), by the 
Roman press (Anon, 1906p), but not apparently by the press in Naples, Il Mattino in 
particular and according to the correspondent of the London Times, always finding 
fault with the central government and its agencies including the army (Anon, 1906l, 
pp.4). In contrast, the government was highly satisfied with the work carried out by the 
army and awarded a medal to all those involved in the emergency operation (Anon, 
2014h).   
  Delmé-Radcliffe (1906, pp. 3) reports a comment of an Italian army officer in 
Terzigno, that once the army arrived the local people showed a reluctance to help 
themselves or others without being paid and that the people generally did not display 
a spirit of self-reliance
29
. This theme of alleged over-dependence on the State 
especially in the later stages of the eruption when the army was fully deployed is 
taken up by other observers included the correspondent of the London Times (Anon, 
1906l) and Henry Johnson-Lavis (quoted by Scarth, 2009, pp. 264). In contrast to 
Etna where eruptions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
common occurrences so that there was a shared memory of what to do when 
confronted with an emergency, the last eruption of Vesuvius that had a major impact 
on the population occurred a generation before in 1872 and 1906 was on a far larger 
scale than anything faced by the people of Etna (Chester et al., 2012), but common 
features were the lauding of heroic acts and the supposed abilities of powerful State 
officials to bring about positive outcomes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
In earlier reports we argued (Chester et al., 2007, 2012) that, during 
emergencies southern Italian popular Catholicism focused on three elements of 
religious belief. Two of these - the supernatural control of eruptions and divine 
                                                 
29
 It could be that many people were suffering from a variety of disaster-related psycho-social problems 
that were not recognised at the time, including grief and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
(Aloudat and Christiansen, 2012, pp.570-71).  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 26 
appeasement of the supposed wrath of God - have been discussed in section 5.1, but 
the third, the role of heroic figures, is relevant to the State response. In addition a 
common feature of many pre-industrial societies is that, when faced with 
catastrophes, people relate to individuals rather than anonymous administrative 
structures (Chester et al., 2012, Table 1). Accounts of the reactions of the people to: 
visits by members of the royal family, particularly the King and Queen; the example 
of devotion to duty shown by Raffaele Matteucci, Director of the Observatory and to 
a lesser extent visits by government ministers, often went beyond simply applauding 
their actions and became hagiographic. To quote two of many reports: the New York 
Times, notes that when the King and Queen
30
 arrived, ‘without question…their 
presence … had a really tranquilizing effect upon the peasantry (sic) evicted by the 
forces of nature’ (Anon, 1906q, pp.8); while the same paper remarks later in the 
eruption and with reference to Raffaele Matteucci, that ‘the knowledge of this man, in  
the midst of peril far greater, indescribably greater than that of the inhabitants of 
Naples, (he) remained cool and full of faith that conditions were about to grow 
brighter, (and this) must surely have served to calm the fears of thousands’ (Anon, 
1906r).  There can be no doubt that Matteucci and his team
31
 acted in an exemplary 
fashion, that the presence of the monarch
32
, cabinet minsters
33
 and other dignitaries
34
, 
                                                 
30
 Queen Elena (1873-1952), formerly Princess of Montenegro.  
31
 The role of Raffaele Matteucci, Giuseppe Mercalli, Frank Perret and others at the observatory has 
been discussed by many authors (e.g. Delmé-Radcliffe,1906; Hoffer, 1982; Scarth, 2009) and for 
detailed information reference should be made to these works. Briefly Matteucci, Mercalli  and Perret 
stayed at their posts in the observatory during the worst of the eruption, sent frequent reports of activity 
and gave advice the authorities. For his dedication, Matteucci was decorated by the King following the 
eruption. 
32
 On April 12
th
 at dawn King Vittorio Emanuele left the Royal Palace in Naples by car to visit the 
affected area, followed sometime later by Queen Elena (Anon, 1906t). When the royal party reached 
Somma Vesuviana the ash was so thick, that the King was forced to set out on foot. At this point his 
presence had an almost messianic effect and people fell at his feet, begging for help which he 
promised. The monarch then used a horse to reach Ottaviano, and later visited San Giuseppe and other 
settlements, the reactions of the people being the same (Scarth, 2009, pp. 267). Earlier on April 7
th
 the  
Duca d’Aosta in his visit to Boscotrecase was accompanied by the Duchess and Princess Louise of 
Holstein, a relative and member of the British royal family.  
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not only raised the profile of the emergency at the time, but also encouraged actions to 
aid recovery involving both financial assistance and post-eruption reconstruction (see 
section 6.).  
‘Dark’ (or grief) tourism are visits made to disaster locations in order to view 
destruction. On Etna in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries such visits 
were an unwelcome feature, and the authorities had to manage tourists in 1852, 1879, 
1910 and 1923. Following the advent of the electric telegraph and the railways, what 
had been a trickle of tourists in the mid-nineteenth century became a flood by its close 
(Chester et al., 2012). During and following the 1906 eruption ‘dark’ tourism also 
featured
35
 and photographs published by Marasco (2014e), show hoards of people 
visiting eruption sites. On April 27
th
 King Edward of Great Britain, Queen Alexandra 
and a royal party interrupted their cruise to visit Naples and the clean up operation, 
having previously sent a message of support at the time of the eruption. They would 
later make a cash donation to aid recovery (see section 6.). More worrisome were two 
groups of passengers from the White Star liner, Cretic, and the North German Lloyd 
steamer, Barbarossa, who on April 16 visited the observatory against the wishes of 
the police and Carabinieri. One press report implies that they were clearly not 
welcomed by the authorities (Anon, 1906u). 
 
6. Recovering from the eruption over the short and long term 
                                                                                                                                            
33
 In addition to the Prime Minister, Sydney Sommino, visits were made by: the Naples-born Finance 
Minister and later (wartime) Prime Minister, Antonio Salandra (1853-1931); Giuseppe de Nava (1858-
1924), Under-Secretary of State and born in Reggio Calabria; and the Minister of Public Works, Pietrio 
Carmine (1841-1913).     
34
 The most important non-royal dignitaries represented the church. In addition to Cardinal Prisco (see 
section 5.1), the Naples born Bishop of Nola (Agnello Renzullo -1836-1925) was also heavily 
involved, while the Pope (Pius X) sent messages of support from Rome (Avvisati and Casale, 2006). 
The Pope was prevented from visiting in person. As a result of a long-standing dispute with the Italian 
State over the loss of papal lands at the time of unification, the Pope viewed himself as a prisoner 
confined to the Vatican (Anon, 1906s).   
35
 On April 8
th
 at the beginning of the eruption there was the mass exodus of many frightened tourists, 
which required a greatly augmented train service (Hobbs, 1906, pp. 640).  
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 In common with the 1883 eruption of Krakatau, the 1906 San Francisco and 
later the 1908 Messina earthquake, the eruption of Vesuvius was one of the first 
disasters to be reported globally. The widespread use of the electric telegraph meant 
that the recovery was, not only supported from within Italy, but also had a strong 
international dimension. Moral support came from the Heads of State of France, 
Germany, Russia and the UK and official condolences were sent through their 
ambassadors by the governments of Argentina, Belgium, hina, Japan and the 
Netherlands (Anon, 1906j). More practical measures soon followed with monetary 
donations being channelled through the Comitato Centrale di Soccorso (Central 
Relief Committee), which was chaired by the Duca d’ Aosta (see section 4). By April 
1908 total voluntary donations amounted to 3 million lira (ca. 577,000 US $) and 
were dominated by sums raised from within Italy by individuals, businesses, the 
Catholic Church and through charitable events held across the country. From abroad 
major collections were made from expatriate communities, in Argentina, Brazil and 
the USA; and from governments, monarchs and individuals. A donation of 1,000 lira 
(ca. 200 US $) was even made by Buffalo Bill Cody, who was touring Italy with his 
Wild West show at the time (Avvisati and Casale, 2006, pp. 55-56). 
 This international support for the people of the region was impressive, but 
recovery was planned and overwhelmingly funded by national and local government. 
In the short-term, policies and their funding were impressive. In rural areas of Naples 
and contiguous provinces affected by ash, lapilli and laharic debris (i.e. ca. 100, 000 
ha and ca. 340,000 people), reclamation involved: land clearance; some temporary tax 
relief for farmers, the restoration of water supply and the dredging of sediment choked 
water-courses. Public works included the removal of ash and lapilli from roads, 
repairing public buildings and the assumption of State responsibility for road 
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maintenance for a period of two years. Special grants were awarded to the worst 
affected comuni, i.e. Ottaviano, San Gennaro, San Giuseppe and Somma Vesuviana, 
aid was given to Nola and the Oratorio area of Boscotrecase to offset losses in tax 
income. Loans to adversely affected comuni were made available for up to 50 years.
36
 
Finally the Ministry of Education assisted in the restoration of the damaged 
observatory with a grant of 50,000 lira (Avvisati and Casale, 2006).  
 The roads and areas of settlement in the Oratorio district of Boscotrecase that 
were inundated by lava were largely re-established following the pre-1906 pattern. 
The Circumvesuviana railway line was re-built across the southern lobe of the 1906 
flow, but was redirected around the front of the northern lobe following a more direct 
route to Boscotrecase station. Prior to 1906 there was little development upslope from 
Boscotrecase so damage here was limited. 
 Impressive though this plan was at the time, both the solidarity of Italians for 
their benighted compatriots and financial support from government came to an end 
relatively quickly.  In the longer term the region was forced to fend for itself (Avvisati 
and Casale, 2006, pp. 57-62). As Johnston-Lavis (1909, pp. 189) notes, in areas 
covered by predominantly fine ash agricultural recovery was rapid, and even in 
Ottaviano comune farmers were planting cabbages and lettuces by early May. 
Contaminants were washed out by heavy rainfall and much of the vegetation was 
showing signs of recovery when Johnston-Lavis again visited the affected areas in 
October. The same cannot be said for, either land covered by lapilli or other volcanic 
products or for the urban fabrics of affected towns and villages. 
The timing of the disaster was unfortunate coming as it did a year after the 
1905 Campanian earthquake and only just over two and a half years before the 
                                                 
36
 The value of aid is estimated at: water supply and rural water tanks, 5,800,000 lira; water-course 
improvement, 2 m lira; public works, 3 m lira; special grants to the 5 several affected comuni , 225, 
000 lira and aid to the observatory 50,000 lira (Avvisati and Casale, 2006, pp. 57-62). 
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devastating (magnitude 7.1) Messina earthquake of December 1908. Although 
estimates vary, around 80,000 people died in the Messina earthquake and costs are 
calculated at 600 m lira, or roughly ten times those of the 1906 eruption, but as 
argued in section 4.2, the figure for 1906 is probably a significant underestimate 
(Bosworth, 1981, Teramo et al., 2008; Guidoboni et al., 2014).  
When expressed as a percentage of national GDP the costs of three events at 
first sight appear modest, ca.0.3% for the 1905 earthquake and 1906 eruption, and 
3.1% for the Messina disaster, but are comparable to the costs of large-scale disasters 
which  have occurred in economically less developed countries in recent years.
37
 In 
common with the 2004 tsunami losses in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, from an Italian 
perspective losses from the three early twentieth century disasters were expressed 
regionally, affecting only the southern part of the country. Indeed when the maximum 
loss by province is calculated, losses rise to  ca.7% of GDP for Cosenza Province in 
1905 and ca.130% for Messina Province (Sicily) in 1908 (Daniell, 2012, personal 
communication). A maximum provincial loss figure has not been calculated for 
Naples Province following the 1906 eruption, but in view of the localised devastation 
it must have been very high.  Recovery was also inhibited, because less than a decade 
later Italy entered the First World War which placed a brake on investment unrelated 
to the war effort.  
The slow pace of recovery may be monitored using population figures. As 
Table 5 shows, the Provincia di Napoli as a whole and the city of Naples in particular 
(i.e.  Naples comune) increased their population numbers despite the eruption, but for 
comuni lying in the northern zone and most affected by ash and lapilli, the effects 
                                                 
37
 The most costly recent disaster was the Haitian earthquake of 2010 (104-117% of GDP), a small 
island disaster that affected the whole country. Losses from the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, affected 
localised regions of many countries, yet still  cost Sri Lanka and Indonesia 7% and 2% of GDP, 
respectively (Anon 2014e).  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 31 
were devastating, with population numbers either growing very slowly or in some 
cases declining. Indeed for some comuni, rates of growth were still below the 
provincial average between the 1911 and 1921 censuses, with the small settlements of 
Lauro, San Gennaro and Scisciano being particularly badly affected.   
An example of delayed recovery is evidenced by a detailed account of the 
reconstruction of San Giuseppe (Ambrosio, 2001) which shows that it took many 
years for the village to regain its former vigour and even then needed tranches of 
outside aid in this case from charities. The reconstructed primary school built by the 
Italian Red Cross did not, for instance, reopen until 1910, the partially destroyed town 
hall had to wait until 1926 and in the same year the church was fully re-opened, its 
restoration being supported by donations received from Italy and abroad as a result of 
the hard work of the parish priest, Don Giuseppe Ambrosio.  
 
7. The lessons of the 1906 eruption for hazard responses today 
 From 1631 to 1944 Vesuvius was in almost continuous eruption, comprising: 
lava filling, and sometimes overflowed the summit crater; summit activity and from 
time to time effusions from parasitic vents (Kilburn and McGuire, 2001; Ricciardi, 
2009; Brown 2012). The inhabitants of the region were well aware that they were 
living on or in the vicinity of an active volcano, the last major eruption was in 1872 
and the Province of Naples was an area of high emigration and few newcomers, with 
the result that there were relatively few people who lacked direct disaster experience 
(see section 2.). When Vesuvius erupted in 1929 and 1944, the experience of 1906 
was still part of both the folk memory of the region and the actual memories of many 
individuals who had been affected by these events (Chester et al., 2007).  
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 As argued at the start of the paper (section 1.), disasters exemplify a balance 
between vulnerability and its resilience and in many respects the region of Vesuvius 
is more exposed to hazards than it was in the early twentieth century. The events of 
1906 are beyond living memory, young adults in 1944 are now in their late 80s and 
the vast majority of the population has no first-hand experience of an eruption. The 
population has swollen putting more people at risk, with the flanks of the volcano 
supporting around 600,000 people (section 1.) and some of the villages - particularly 
those in the vicinity of Naples - growing to form a virtually continuous urban area. Of 
the villages listed in Table 5: Sant’Anastasia had a population of 27,296 in the 2011 
census; Somma Vesuviana 34,592; Nola 33,979; Ottaviano 23,543; San Gennaro 
11,073; San Giuseppe 27,467; Boscotrecase 10,416; Lauro 3,577 and Scisciano 5,775, 
a total of over 177,000 as opposed to only ca.67,000 in 1901.  
 An additional area of vulnerability concerns buildings. Although volcanic 
earthquakes only caused minor damage in 1906, this was more noticeable in 1944 
(Chester et al., 2007) and all active southern Italian volcanoes have a high degree of 
exposure because of the large number of traditional buildings constructed of lava 
blocks and/or rubble stone (Chester et al., 2012). The 1906 eruption also highlighted 
the fragility of traditional roof construction when required to support the weight of 
ash and lapilli, and many towns and villages still have large number of older buildings 
with roofs similar to those that caused so many deaths and so much damage (see 
Spence et al., 2005). Much of the increased population is housed in buildings 
constructed since 1906, though until recently these did not comply with strict 
earthquake codes.
38
 
                                                 
38
 The current building code dates from 2008 and was developed in response to the 2002 Molise 
earthquake which exposed major deficiencies in code in operation at the time. There were also issues 
over enforcement. Hence in the L’Aquila earthquake of 2009 some buildings which were only 10 to 20 
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 In section 5 we argued that responses to the 1906 emergency were generally 
effective and that at least in its initial stages recovery was actively supported by the 
State. In one respect people were fortunate in 1906 as they were in 1944
39
, because 
eruptions developed over a few days allowing time for both local people and the 
authorities to plan their responses.
40
 As Delmé-Radcliffe (1906, pp. 8) notes, at the 
time the local civil authorities lacked the powers effectively to mastermind such a 
large-scale operation, although the positive role of the provincial prefect was 
noteworthy (see section 5.2). Into this partial power vacuum stepped the military and 
national government, generally, and more particularly Prime Minister Sonnino and the 
Duca d’Aosta. In 1944 Col. Kincaid played a similar leadership role. Mindful of the 
importance of effective management in securing the success of responses to civil 
emergencies, the Chief Civil Protection Officer can now obtain similar powers to 
those exercised by the key figures in 1906 and 1944.
41
  
One legacy of 1906 and 1944 is less benevolent. This is the assumption 
amongst some inhabitants that twentieth century eruptions were normative and that 
future events will not cause greater or more widespread damage
42
, but this finding is 
not supported by a detailed questionnaire-based survey carried out in 2006 and 
                                                                                                                                            
years old performed very badly (OECD, 2014, pp. 76).  The 2008 code reflects the European-wide 
Eurocode, but has been modified for local conditions (Santucci de Magistris, 2011).    
39
 The 1944 eruption occurred during the Second World War, and the emergency response was 
efficiently handled by the Allied Control Commission in Naples under the effective management of an 
American army officer, Lt. Col. (later Brig. General) James Leslie Kincaid (1884-1973) (Chester et al., 
2007).  
40
 As Delmé-Radcliffe (1906, pp. 8) notes, in 1906 the authorities were surprised by how quickly the 
eruption developed and by the fact it was much larger and lasted longer than the four day event of 
1872. Their complacency may have been hightened by initially optimist reports on April 6
th
 from the 
Observatory that the ash fall would be limited in extent and duration. In the early stages of the eruption 
Raffaele Matteucci also forecast that the eruption would end after a few days (Perret, 1906, in Gidwitz, 
2013). Nevertheless, when this report was sent, the eruption was already two days old and some plans 
were already in place (Table 1).    
41
 Following the declaration of a State of Emergency, by the Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 
(President of the Council of Minister, or Prime Minister), the Chief Civil Protection Officer assumes 
similar powers to those exercised by the Duca d’Aosta and Colonel Kincaid in 1906 and 1944 (R. 
Scandone, personal communication 9/01/06). 
42
 In 2004 two of us (Chester and Duncan) were involved in interviews with local political leaders 
within comuni affected by the 1944 eruption. This opinion emerged strongly (see Chester et al., 2007). 
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focused on the comuni most at risk (Barberi et al., 2008). This survey found that 
people generally possessed a realistic view of volcanic risk, but often rated other 
socio-economic issues as being more important and had little confidence in the 
abilities of public officials, civil protection officers or scientists successfully to handle 
a future emergency. A sub-plinian eruption, such as that of 1631, is often assumed to 
be the most likely future scenario (Barberi et al., 1990), involving a high eruption 
column, its eventual collapse, large-scale tephra deposition and generation of 
dangerous pyroclastic density currents comprising flows and surges (Rosi et al., 
1993).  In order to boost resilience (section 1) and mindful that better pre-eruption 
planning is required, an emergency plan was published in 1995 (Dipartimento delle 
Protezione Civile, 1995). Assuming that a ‘1631 type’ eruption will be preceded by 
seismic and other warnings for up to 20 days, it is planned to evacuate around 
700,000 people from a so called ‘red zone’ of particularly high risk to other parts of 
Italy over a period of 7 days. It is a matter of conjecture how many of these 20 days 
will pass before scientists are able to say with any certainty whether an eruption is 
imminent. The 20 day ‘window’ is based on the observation that earthquakes were felt 
for at least a fortnight before the 1631 eruption, which may not be the case with all 
sub-plinian events (Chester et al., 2002; Solana et al., 2008). More recent academic 
research suggests that the ‘1631 type’ event may be too extreme (e.g. Marzocchi et 
al., 2004), but the plan is unlikely to change because hazard managers are of the 
opinion that ‘downsizing’ the scenario causes fewer potential planning problems than 
‘upsizing’ it (De  Vivo and Rolandi, 2012). Such a view does not take into account, 
however, the loss of public trust engendered by failing accurately to forecast the 
magnitude of a future event (Solana et al., 2008).  
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Reacting to these criticisms the government has regularly revised the 
emergency plan since 1995. This has involved, inter alia: a. detailed changes in 2001; 
b. modifications to the constitution of the committee which advises the Chief Civil 
Protection Officer in 2003; c. in 2006 the plan was tested in a major emergency 
simulation exercise known as Mesimex; d. following Mesimex changes were made to 
the plan in 2007, 2008 and 2012 and all this culminated in a major up-dating in 
February 2014 (Dipartimento delle Protezione Civile, 2014). The plan now: defines 
the ‘red zone’, not only in terms of exposure to pyroclastic flows, but also with 
respect to risks associated with the collapse of buildings due to the accumulation of 
pyroclastic deposits and further refines the evacuation plan and the time-scale over 
which it will operate. 
In 1906 the population was less well educated and demanding and, hence, 
more forgiving of scientific error. Indeed the fact that in the early stages of the 
eruption Raffaele Matteucci forecast that the eruption would end after a few days was 
soon forgotten in the wave of adulation he received because of his bravery and 
devotion to duty (see section 5.2). Whatever the future may hold in terns of future 
eruptions, the fact remains that pre-planning is required and, though 1906 and 1944 
were examples of fairly successful ad hoc management, this cannot be taken as a 
guarantee of future success.  
The questionnaire-based survey quoted above (Barberi, et al., 2008), showed 
that people had a widespread lack of knowledge about the emergency plan and little 
confidence in it, while a second study by members of the present research group 
(Solana et al., 2008) argued that the knowledge required by the civil authorities to 
deal successfully with a future emergency was incomplete. Together, these surveys 
point to the need for both: better communication between policy makers, scientists 
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and the public; and more focused education programmes. Two initiatives have 
attempted to mitigate these problem, EXPLORIS (i.e. Baxter et al., 2008) and 
Vesuvius 2000 (Dobran, 2006), but with limited success in either improving 
communications or in fulfilling the goal of reducing the vulnerability of the 
population (Dobran, 2006).   
Elements of pre-industrial resilience still feature in Italy’s responses to 
disasters. On Etna the salvaging of personal effects, household goods and even 
agricultural produce is still an important part of present-day responses (Chester et al., 
2012) and may be expected to recur following a future eruption of Vesuvius, provided 
local people have enough time to plan. Self-salvage reflects the low take-up of 
insurance against natural perils and may be expected to decline in future, especially if 
plans to provide compulsory hazard insurance policies underwritten by the Italian 
State come to fruition (Garonna, 2011).  
The most prominent feature to survive from the pre-industrial era, are 
religious responses and these still accompany major disasters in southern Italy. 
Examples include reactions to: the Irpinian earthquake of 1980 (Alexander, 1990) and 
various eruptions of Etna which have occurred during the last twenty years (Chester et 
al., 2008), and there seems little doubt that religion would feature in any future 
eruption of Vesuvius. ‘Parallel practice’ (see section 5.1), where people believe that 
disasters reflect God’s wrath which can only propitiated by liturgical action but at the 
same time accept State and community support to assist recovery, remains part of 
belief system of a large proportion of population who reside on or near to Vesuvius.        
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Table 1. Eruptive phases of the 1906 eruption (Based on Scarth, 2009, with additional 
information from:- a. contemporary accounts: Gangiulo, 1906; Hobbs,1906; Johnston-
Lavis, 1909; Lacroix, 1906, 1908; Mercalli, 1906, 1908; Perret, 1924. b. more recent 
studies: Bertagnini et al., 1991; Scandone et al., 1993; Rosi et al. 1993;  Nazzaro 
1997; Scarth and Tanguy, 2001; Guest et al., 2003; Casale, 1996 Avvistati and Casale, 
2006). 
 
Table 2. Economic losses (Based on: Albatino, undated; Anon, 1906e, 1906g, 1906h, 
1906i, 1906j, 1906k; Anon, 1908b;  Delmé-Radcliffe, 1906; Casale, 1996; Nazzaro, 
1997; Avvisati & Casale, 2006; Ricciardi, 2009 and the references cited in the body of 
the table).  
 
Table 3.  The theology and theodicy of southern Italian popular Catholicism (Based 
on: Carroll 1992, 1996; Chester et al. 2008, 2012). 
 
Table 4. Summary of the military response to the 1906 eruption (based on Delmé-
Radcliffe, 1906, with additional information from the sources cited). In the military 
the hierarchy of units in order of decreasing size is: Army; Corp; Division; Brigade; 
Regiment and Company. For the locations of places mentioned in the table see Figs. 1 
and 3. 
 
Table 5. Population change in selected areas affected by the 1906 eruption. Sant’ 
Anastasia, Somma Vesuviana, Nola, Ottaviano, San Gennaro and San Giuseppe are 
the comuni most damaged by ash and lapilli (Fig. 3). Boscotrecase was affected in 
part by lava and Lauro and Scisciano are two small settlements, which lie to the north 
east of Vesuvius (Fig.1) and were badly affected by distal ash and lapilli deposits    
(Data from Anon, 2014i). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Vesuvius: Location map (based on Chester, D.K., Duncan, A.M., 2007 
Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 166, Fig. 1, pp. 205).     
 
Figure 2  Map illustrating the extent of historic eruptions of Vesuvius. Compiled from 
various sources. 
 
Figure 3  Map showing products of the 1906 eruption. The information on lava flows 
is based on Perret (1924) and that on the area covered by tephra on April 8
th
 on data in 
Lacroix (1906) (based on Chester, D.K., Duncan, A.M., 2007 Journal of Volcanology 
and Geothermal Research 166, Fig. 2, pp. 207).     
 
Figure 4 The course of the lava which destroyed part of Boscotrecase and caused 
devastation to agricultural land. Based on mapping by V. Sabatini and H. J. Johnston-
Lavis (reproduced from Johnston-Lavis, 1909 - Transactions of the Royal Dublin 
Society 9 (9), Fig. 22, no page numbers). 
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Figure 5 Lava invading the courtyard of the villa of M. and T. Borosio in 
Boscotrecase (reproduced from Johnston-Lavis, 1909 - Transactions of the Royal 
Dublin Society 9 (9), Fig. 16, no page numbers). 
 
Figure 6 One of the final ash ejections from the summit (reproduced from Johnston-
Lavis, 1909 - Transactions of the Royal Dublin Society 9 (9), Fig. 6 no page numbers) 
 
Figure 7 A small pyroclastic density current (PDC) generated late in the eruption 
(reproduced from Johnston-Lavis, 1909 - Transactions of the Royal Dublin Society 9 
(9), Fig. 9, no page numbers). 
 
Figure 8 Houses buried by lava up to their vaulted roofs in the Oratorio area of 
Boscotrecase. Elsewhere vaulted roofs proved to be strong and resistant to ash loading 
(reproduced from Johnston-Lavis, 1909 - Transactions of the Royal Dublin Society 9 
(9), Fig. 17, no page numbers). 
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Table 1 
Phases and effects of the 
Eruption 
Details 
Pre-Eruption a. Feb-March, strombolian activity gradually increased 
during the last ten days of March.     
b. From March 20
th
 the discharge of thermal streams at Torre 
Annunziata became weaker and water levels in wells fell by 
20-30 cm. Ground inflation was noted on the north coast of 
the Bay of Naples (i.e. 20 cm at Naples), 48 cm near the 
volcano at Portici and 30-40 cm at Torre Annunziate. These 
data imply that magma was moving into the volcano. 
c. April 3
rd
 – an explosion occurred in the central crater 
 
Initial phase (April 4-8)  a. The eruption began at 05.30 h on April 4
th
 with a fissure 
opening at 1,200 m on the southern flank which produced a 
small lava flow. Many tremors occurred and solid fragments 
were ejected. 
b. During the night of April 4
th
 and 5
th
, dark-grey ash was 
deposited as far away as Naples and around midnight a 
lower, larger vent opened at ca.800 m. Lava was vigorously 
erupted and travelled 2.5 km from the vent. 
c. On the morning of April 5
th
 the badly damaged funicular
1
 
made its last trip and Frank Perret used this service to return 
to the observatory where he joined the Director, Raffaele  
Matteucci. During the morning ash and gases were expelled 
explosively from the crater. 
d. April 6
th
 – a third vent opened on the SW flank (height ca. 
600 m and emitted a large volume of lava, the flow dividing 
into three streams: one flowed towards Torre Annuziata, 
destroying woodlands and crops; another travelled towards 
Boscotrecase and a third approached Terzigno and covered 
land sterilised by lavas from the 1834 and 1850 eruptions 
and, hence, caused far less damage.  
e. At 15.00 hr on April 7
th
 the lava stopped at the cemetery 
about 500 m from the town. Assuming that they were safe, 
the inhabitants began to move furniture back into homes. At 
16.30 h loud explosions were heard as far away as Naples 
and in the evening spatter, ash and lapilli were ejected to a 
height of 2 km and covered the upper 2-300 m of the 
volcano.   
Second phase (April 8) a. The central crater was the site of explosive activity which 
increased in intensity early on Palm Sunday, April 8
th
. At 
00.30 h there were strong explosions and an earthquake, and 
at 02.30 h a violent earthquake and emission of ash covered 
the north east sector of the volcano with a considerable 
quantity of tephra (both ash and lapilli). The villages of 
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Ottaviano (at the time known as Ottajano
2
) and S. Giuseppe 
were badly affected and tephra reached a thickness of 1.25 
m, causing several buildings to collapse, including the roof 
of the Oratorio Church (Chiesa dell’Oratorio dello Spirito 
Santo) in San Giuseppe which collapsed and killed 105 
people sheltering within it. After 03.30- 4.00 h, a sub-plinian 
ash column was generated and during the afternoon reached 
a height of 13 km. This sub-plinian phase lasted 18 hours 
and eroding the walls of the crater, which eventually led to 
the collapse of the summit cone
3
.      
b. Beginning on April 8
th
, but continuing until the beginning 
of the final phase of the eruption on April 11
th
, rain 
containing ash fell on Naples and Torre del Greco, making 
the ash covering many buildings much heavier and 
contributing to further building collapses at Ottaviano and 
San Giuseppe. On the west flank fall deposits destroyed the 
funicular and threatened the observatory, but the Director 
Raffaele Matteucci and Frank Perret remained in post, 
continuing their meticulous recording of the eruption.   
c. A further lava flow advanced on Boscotrecase. In a few 
hours it had destroyed the Oratorio quarter, invaded the 
church of Santa Anna, surrounded and killed 3 elderly men, 
cut the road to Torre Annunziata, filled a 500 m railway 
cutting and was threatening Torre Annunziata. At 08.00 h 
the lava halted only ca.10 m from the cemetery on the 
outskirts of the town. Around 100 houses were destroyed in 
Oratorio (Figs. 4 and 5).  
Final phase (April 9-22) a. Sub-plinian activity continued on April 11
th
 and 12
th
 with 
the cocoa coloured ash changing to a grey hue. Large 
volumes of ash were erupted which fell on many settlements 
in the region including the city of Naples. On April 10
th
 the 
roof of the Monte Oliveto market (located in today’s Piazza 
Carita) collapsed and caused deaths and injuries. Heavy 
rainfall generated lahars which caused extensive damage 
particularly in and around Ottaviano. 
b. April 13
th
 and 14
th
 the ash fall became white in colour, 
and the eruption continued with diminishing energy until 
Sunday 21
st
 of April. 
Post-eruption damage Ash and lapilli had a thickness of: Ottaviano - 70-100 cm; 
San Giuseppe - 50- 60 cm; Osservatorio - 21 cm; Portici and 
Torre Annunziata -19 cm; Cercola - 12 cm) and Naples - 2 
cm.   
a. April 27
th
 and 28
th
 heavy rainfall mobilised thick debris 
into mudflows on the northern flank, which destroyed two 
railway bridges, field crops, vineyards, orchards, woodlands 
and pastures, causing damage in Pollena, Cercola and 
Terzigno. The upper 2/3 of the funicular was swept away 
including the restaurant, station, engine house, boiler and 
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stables. 
b. May 18
th
 a mudflow caused damage in Resina, and on 
May 20
th
/21
st
  Cercola, Massa di Somma, Pollena and San 
Sebestiano were badly affected. Up to 1 m of material was 
deposited. 
c. Portici and Torre del Greco were affected by the 
remobilisation ashes as mudflows in October 1908. 
  
 
1
The funicular  (It. funicolare) was a railway managed from the 1890’s 
by the travel agents Thomas Cook and Sons.  Officially the Thomas 
Cook & Son’s Vesuvius Railway, it was colloquially termed the 
funicular, although it was only a cable railway for its upper section when 
it ascended the cone. The middle section was a ‘rack’ railway and the 
lower section was worked by normal adhesion. Although the lower and 
middle sections were quickly restored after 1906, the upper part had to 
re-built and was not re-opened until 1909 (Smith, 1998). 
2
 The village of Ottajano was re-named Ottaviano in 1933. In this paper 
it will be referred to by its current name.  
3 
The eruption caused more damage to the cone than any since 1822. 
Some 115 m was removed from the summit and in May 1906 the new 
crater was 600 m deep and 700 m in diameter. The crater rim was 1,100 
m high in the east and 1,200 in the west.  
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Table 2 
 Damage 
Buildings Major damage was concentrated in Boscotrecase (lava) and 
Ottaviano and San Giuseppe (ash and lapilli).  
Boscotrecase An estimated 100 homes in the suburb of Oratorio 
were destroyed or badly damaged and one stream of lava flowed 
into the church of S. Anna. The walls of many ruined buildings 
were precarious and had be knocked down or guarded by troops. 
Damage would have been worse if the lava had not flowed into 
and filled a depression known as the Vallone Izzo (depth ca.30 m) 
and, indeed, the volume of lava held in this depression meant the 
lava did not reach Torre Annunziata. Some architecturally 
significant buildings were destroyed including the Bifulco Palace. 
The parish priest, Don Carmine Russo, reported the loss of 
baptismal records.   
Ottaviano Virtually all the buildings were damaged and some, 
including the municipal buildings, were destroyed by collapse 
(Fig. 8). 
San Giuseppe In addition to the collapse of the roof of the 
Oratorio Church (Chiesa dell’Oratorio dello Spirito Santo- see 
Table 1), several houses fell to the ground and most buildings 
were scarred by roof failure. Some buildings escaped damage 
because of their distinctive domes roofs.  
Naples  The roof of the Monte Oliveto market, covering an area 
of 56 m
2
, collapsed and caused deaths (see section 3.1). It may 
have been weakened by earlier earthquakes. Only poorly 
constructed houses suffered damage to their roofs.
1
 
Other damaged settlements  
Boscoreale, Cercola, Poggiomarino, Pollena, Pomigliano d’ Arco, 
Portici, Resina, San Gennaro, San Giorgio e Cremano, San 
Giovanni, Somma Vesuviana, Terzigno, Torre del Greco.  
 
Agricultural 
Land 
As Figure 3 shows a considerable area - especially on the north 
and north east flanks - was covered by ash, while lava sterilised 
land to the south east in the vicinity of Casa Bianca, Boscotrecase 
and Torre Annunziata.  
Later more land was covered by lahars and the effects of floods:- 
a. April 27
th
 to April 28
th
 - Ottaviano and Cercola.  
b. May 17
th
 and 18
th
 - Resina.  
c. May 20
th
 and 21
st
 - San Sebastiano, Cercola and Pollena.  
d. October and November (various dates) autumn rains produced 
lahars that affected the Torre del Greco area.  
e. January 4
th
 1907 - torrential rain mobilised mudflows (le 
collate di frango) which covered land in the Resina area. 
f. October 9
th
/10
th
  and 27
th
/28
th
 damage in the Torre del Greco, 
Resina, San Sebastiano, Cercola and Pollena areas. 
g. April 14
th
 1908 further damage between Resina and Torre del 
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Greco. 
h. October 24
th
 1910 further damage on the south west flank near 
Torre del Greco. 
Of the estimate losses of 60,000 million lira: and estimated 20% 
occurred in the comuni of Ottaviano and Somma Vesuviana; 12% 
in S. Giuseppe Vesuviano; 9% in Nola; 5% in  Palma Campania 
and 3% in Marigliano, Naples and Lauro. 
   
Communications a. Railways 
The Thomas Cook & Son’s Vesuvius Railway was badly affected 
and not fully restored until 1909 (see Table 1 footnote 1). Other 
railways were affected less severely and were soon restored. For 
instance, the circum-Vesuvian railway was cut in several places 
(Anon, 1906g) - at Boscotrecase by lava and elsewhere by air 
fall, as was railway along the coast (Delmé-Radcliffe, 1906, pp. 7 
see Fig. 3). Following the eruption, some railway bridges were 
destroyed by lahars 
b. Roads 
Roads were covered by ash/lapilli and near Boscotrecase by lava. 
Several bridges failed, both during the eruption and subsequent 
laharic activity.    
c. Telecommunications 
Ottaviano, San Giuseppe, Terzigno and some other settlements 
lost their telegraph links for a short time, but these were soon 
restored. Links to the observatory were cut, but quickly restored 
my military engineers (Ricciardi, 2009, pp. 732-733). Most of the 
telegraph lines remained intact.   
 
The authorities made a great and generally successful effort to 
restore communications (see section 5.2). 
 
1
 Information based on an interview with Assessore Gennaro Ambrosio in the 
the comune of San Giuseppe Vesuviano on 10/9/04.  
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Table 3 
Theodicy is defined as any attempt to reconcile the idea of a loving God with the 
existence of suffering in the world, and in the popular Catholicism of the Italian 
south this is expressed in three ways:- 
a. Disasters have to be accepted as justified expressions of divine anger with a 
sinful people. 
b. People can appease God’s wrath by actions which involve the use of images, 
effigies and relics of saints and the Madonna. 
c. Intercession to saintly supernatural figures have the power to change God’s 
mind through intercessory prayer.  
 
Orthodox Catholic theology holds that Christ and God are co-equal, and the Virgin 
Mary and the saints are mortals and possess no power of their own to change the 
divine mind. Saints can only intercede through the agency of Jesus Christ.  
Southern Italian popular Catholicism is, however,  heterodox ‘Christ is more 
powerful than God the Father, Mary is more powerful than Christ; and Saint 
Joseph, the universal father, is more powerful than God the Father, Christ and he 
Madonna together. But more powerful than God and all the saints is the one saint 
that – from as far back as…. the Middle Ages – the inhabitants of a given place 
have selected as their patron’ (Carroll, 1992, pp. 15-16). 
 
Under the influence of the European Enlightenment in the 18
th
 century, other 
models of theodicy became more important, in particular the view that the world is 
‘best of all possible worlds’ that could be created by God, disasters representing 
the operation of extreme natural processes. Southern Italy Catholicism remained 
wedded to ideas of divine wrath and punishment…., although the ‘greater good’ 
may be found in Christian praxis where such qualities as self-sacrifice, cohesion of 
family and community are expressed in Catholic social action.  
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Table 4 
Date Military Action 
Friday 6
th
  1000 troops and 10 wagons were sent from Naples to Torre 
Annunziata. The General Officer commanding in Salerno (a major 
city to the south of the region) was ordered to transfer his 
headquarters to Nocera to be nearer Vesuvius. Although some initial 
efforts were made at Boscotrecase (Anon, 1906b), it was quickly 
concluded that it was futile to either divert lava or to provide 
protection against ash or lapilli were futile.    
Saturday 7
th
 A company of engineers and further 100 infantry and 10 wagons were 
sent to each of the villages of Torre del Greco and Portici.  
Sunday 8
th
  From dawn there was a rapid reaction to the explosive activity that 
occurred during the night of the 7
th
/8
th
 (Table 1). The Duca d’Aosta, 
commanding the Xth Army Corps, fearing that activity would become 
even more violent, issued orders for the volcano to be surrounded by 
a ‘cordon’ of troops, better to support the civil power. The whole 
region was divided into ‘zones’ under the command of either a 
colonel, or in some cases a Major General, and supplies were moved 
to these forward bases.  The ‘cordon’ was divided into two Divisional 
Commands, one at Naples and the other at Nocera, with Brigade-sized 
units being located at Torre Annuziata and Ottaviano.  
Monday 9
th
 
and 
subsequently 
As it became clear that needs were greater in some areas than in 
others, ‘sub-zones’ were created at: Portici; Resina; San Giorgio a 
Cremona and Terzigno. San Giuseppe and San Gennaro were 
reinforced. To the rear of the ‘cordon’, a second line was established 
with command posts at Marigliano, Nola, Nocera, Palma and 
Poggiomarino.  Major supply depots at Naples, Nola and Nocera 
supplied rations to the various ‘zones’ and ‘sub-zones’, and troops 
cooked food when and where it was required. The Sindaco or 
commissioner of each comune issued a tally to those requiring food. 
As well as supplying, distributing and in some cases cooking food, 
troops were also involved in clearing ash from roofs, transporting the 
injured to hospital, removing/storing furniture and other effects and 
restoring communications. The railway line from Naples to Ottaviano 
was, for instance, re-opened by April 15
th
. Soldiers continued to dig 
through the ash to find any survivors and recover bodies, Colonel 
Delmé-Radcliffe noting that one 80 year old man was saved after 
being buried for five days. 
The number of troops in the inner cordon was ca. 7,000 with 200 
wagons, with some 4,000 soldiers, 1,000 sailors and a further 60 
wagons being held further back in reserve. Armed troops were also 
stationed in Naples in case of any breakdown in law and order. Later 
in the eruption troops in the ‘cordon’ were rotated with 
reinforcements brought in from Rome, who arrived with more 
equipment comprising 50 wagons, over 4,000 shovels, nearly 3,000 
pickaxes and 660 sledge-hammers. The army also requisitioned local 
transport and many pack animals in order to distribute food. 
 
The French and British sent naval personnel to the Bay of Naples, but 
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in the event these forces were not required (Anon 1906n). 
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Table 5  
 
Settlement Population 1901 Change 1901-1911 
(%) 
Change 1911-21 
(%) 
Naples Province 1.25 million 13.7 12.2 
Naples comune 621,213 20.9 14.4 
    
Sant’ Anastasia 8,712 3.9 8.9 
Somma Vesuviana 10,090 4.8 6.0 
Nola 14,511 2.0 7.1 
Ottaviano 8,533 2.7 20.4 
San Gennaro 3,575 -2.5 6.4 
San Giuseppe 10,063 8.1 21.9 
    
Boscotrecase 6,286 8.9 18.3 
    
Lauro 2,945 0.9 -1.7 
Scisciano 2,546 -3.1 5.2 
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Fig 1 
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Fig 2 
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Fig 3 
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Fig 4 
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Fig 5
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Fig 6 
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Fig 7 
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Fig 8 
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Table 1 
Phases and effects of the 
Eruption 
Details 
Pre-Eruption a. From March 20
th
 the discharge of thermal streams at Torre 
Annunziata became weaker and water levels in wells fell by 
20-30 cm. Ground inflation was noted on the north coast of 
the Bay of Naples (i.e. 20 cm at Naples), 48 cm near the 
volcano at Portici and 30-40 cm at Torre Annunziate. These 
data imply that magma was moving into the volcano. 
b. April 3
rd
 – an explosion occurred in the central crater 
 
Initial phase (April 4-8)  a. The eruption began at 05.30 h on April 4
th
 with a fissure 
opening at 1,200 m on the southern flank which produced a 
small lava flow. Many tremors occurred and solid fragments 
were ejected. 
b. During the night of April 4
th
 and 5
th
, dark-grey ash was 
deposited as far away as Naples and around midnight a 
lower, larger vent opened at ca.800 m. Lava was vigorously 
erupted and travelled 2.5 km from the vent. 
c. On the morning of April 5
th
 the badly damaged funicular
1
 
made its last trip and Frank Perret used this service to return 
to the observatory where he joined the Director, Raffaele  
Matteucci. During the morning ash and gases were expelled 
explosively from the crater. 
d. April 6
th
 – a third vent opened on the SW flank (height ca. 
600 m and emitted a large volume of lava, the flow dividing 
into three streams: one flowed towards Torre Annuziata, 
destroying woodlands and crops; another travelled towards 
Boscotrecase and a third approached Terzigno and covered 
land sterilised by lavas from the 1834 and 1850 eruptions 
and, hence, caused far less damage.  
e. At 15.00 hr on April 7
th
 the lava stopped at the cemetery 
about 500 m from the town. Assuming that they were safe, 
the inhabitants began to move furniture back into homes. At 
16.30 h loud explosions were heard as far away as Naples 
and in the evening spatter, ash and lapilli were ejected to a 
height of 2 km and covered the upper 2-300 m of the 
volcano.   
Second phase (April 8) a. The central crater was the site of explosive activity which 
increased in intensity early on Palm Sunday, April 8
th
. At 
00.30 h there were strong explosions and an earthquake, and 
at 02.30 h a violent earthquake and emission of ash covered 
the north east sector of the volcano with a considerable 
quantity of tephra (both ash and lapilli). The villages of 
Ottaviano (at the time known as Ottajano
2
) and S. Giuseppe 
were badly affected and tephra reached a thickness of 1.25 
m, causing several buildings to collapse, including the roof 
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of the Oratorio Church (Chiesa dell’Oratorio dello Spirito 
Santo) in San Giuseppe which collapsed and killed 105 
people sheltering within it. After 03.30- 4.00 h, a sub-plinian 
ash column was generated and during the afternoon reached 
a height of 13 km. This sub-plinian phase lasted 18 hours 
and eroding the walls of the crater, which eventually led to 
the collapse of the summit cone
3
.      
b. Beginning on April 8
th
, but continuing until the beginning 
of the final phase of the eruption on April 11
th
, rain 
containing ash fell on Naples and Torre del Greco, making 
the ash covering many buildings much heavier and 
contributing to further building collapses at Ottaviano and 
San Giuseppe. On the west flank fall deposits destroyed the 
funicular and threatened the observatory, but the Director 
Raffaele Matteucci and Frank Perret remained in post, 
continuing their meticulous recording of the eruption.   
c. A further lava flow advanced on Boscotrecase. In a few 
hours it had destroyed the Oratorio quarter, invaded the 
church of Santa Anna, surrounded and killed 3 elderly men, 
cut the road to Torre Annunziata, filled a 500 m railway 
cutting and was threatening Torre Annunziata. At 08.00 h 
the lava halted only ca.10 m from the cemetery on the 
outskirts of the town. Around 100 houses were destroyed in 
Oratorio (Figs. 4 and 5).  
Final phase (April 9-22) a. Sub-plinian activity continued on April 11
th
 and 12
th
 with 
the cocoa coloured ash changing to a grey hue. Large 
volumes of ash were erupted which fell on many settlements 
in the region including the city of Naples. On April 10
th
 the 
roof of the Monte Oliveto market (located in today’s Piazza 
Carita) collapsed and caused deaths and injuries. Heavy 
rainfall generated lahars which caused extensive damage 
particularly in and around Ottaviano. 
b. April 13
th
 and 14
th
 the ash fall became white in colour, 
and the eruption continued with diminishing energy until 
Sunday 22
nd
 of April. 
Post-eruption damage Ash and lapilli had a thickness of: Ottaviano - 70-100 cm; 
San Giuseppe - 50- 60 cm; Osservatorio - 21 cm; Portici and 
Torre Annunziata -19 cm; Cercola - 12 cm) and Naples - 2 
cm.   
a. April 27
th
 and 28
th
 heavy rainfall mobilised thick debris 
into mudflows on the northern flank, which destroyed two 
railway bridges, field crops, vineyards, orchards, woodlands 
and pastures, causing damage in Pollena, Cercola and 
Terzigno. The upper 2/3 of the funicular was swept away 
including the restaurant, station, engine house, boiler and 
stables. 
b. May 18
th
 a mudflow caused damage in Resina, and on 
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May 21 San Sebestiano and Pollena were badly affected. Up 
to 1 m of material was deposited. 
c. Portici and Torre del Greco were affected by the 
remobilisation ashes as mudflows in October 1908. 
  
 
1
The funicular  (It. funicolare) was a railway managed from the 1890’s 
by the travel agents Thomas Cook and Sons.  Officially the Thomas 
Cook & Son’s Vesuvius Railway, it was colloquially termed the 
funicular, although it was only a cable railway for its upper section when 
it ascended the cone. The middle section was a ‘rack’ railway and the 
lower section was worked by normal adhesion. Although the lower and 
middle sections were quickly restored after 1906, the upper part had to 
re-built and was not re-opened until 1909 (Smith, 1998). 
2
 The village of Ottajano was re-named Ottaviano in 1933. In this paper 
it will be referred to by its current name.  
3 
The eruption caused more damage to the cone than any since 1822. 
Some 115 m was removed from the summit and in May 1906 the new 
crater was 600 m deep and 700 m in diameter. The crater rim was 1,100 
m high in the east and 1,200 in the west.  
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Table 2 
 Damage 
Buildings Major damage was concentrated in Boscotrecase (lava) and 
Ottaviano and San Giuseppe (ash and lapilli).  
Boscotrecase An estimated 100 homes in the suburb of Oratorio 
were destroyed or badly damaged and one stream of lava flowed 
into the church of S. Anna. The walls of many ruined buildings 
were precarious and had be knocked down or guarded by troops. 
Damage would have been worse if the lava had not flowed into 
and filled a depression known as the Vallone Izzo (depth ca.30 m) 
and, indeed, the volume of lava held in this depression meant the 
lava did not reach Torre Annunziata. Some architecturally 
significant buildings were destroyed including the Bifulco Palace. 
The parish priest, Don Carmine Russo, reported the loss of 
baptismal records.   
Ottaviano Virtually all the buildings were damaged and some, 
including the municipal buildings, were destroyed by collapse 
(Fig. 8). 
San Giuseppe In addition to the collapse of the roof of the 
Oratorio Church (Chiesa dell’Oratorio dello Spirito Santo- see 
Table 1), several houses fell to the ground and most buildings 
were scarred by roof failure. Some buildings escaped damage 
because of their distinctive domes roofs.  
Naples  The roof of the Monte Oliveto market, covering an area 
of 56 m
2
, collapsed and caused deaths (see section 3.1). It may 
have been weakened by earlier earthquakes. Only poorly 
constructed houses suffered damage to their roofs.
1
 
Other damaged settlements  
Boscoreale, Cercola, Poggiomarino, Pollena, Pomigliano d’ Arco, 
Portici, Resina, San Gennaro, San Giorgio e Cremano, San 
Giovanni, Somma Vesuviana, Terzigno, Torre del Greco.  
 
Agricultural 
Land 
As Figure 3 shows a considerable area - especially on the north 
and north east flanks - was covered by ash, while lava sterilised 
land to the south east in the vicinity of Casa Bianca, Boscotrecase 
and Torre Annunziata.  
Later more land was covered by lahars and the effects of floods:- 
a. April 27
th
 to April 28
th
 - Ottaviano and Cercola.  
b. May 17
th
 and 18
th
 - Resina.  
c. May 20
th
 and 21
st
 - San Sebastiano, Cercola and Pollena.  
d. October and November (various dates) autumn rains produced 
lahars that affected the Torre del Greco area.  
e. January 4
th
 1907 - torrential rain mobilised mudflows (le 
collate di frango) which covered land in the Resina area. 
f. October 9
th
/10
th
  and 27
th
/28
th
 damage in the Torre del Greco, 
Resina, San Sebastiano, Cercola and Pollena areas. 
g. April 14
th
 1908 further damage between Resina and Torre del 
Greco. 
h. October 24
th
 1910 further damage on the south west flank near 
Torre del Greco. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 71 
Of the estimate losses of 60,000 million lira: and estimated 20% 
occurred in the comuni of Ottaviano and Somma Vesuviana; 12% 
in S. Giuseppe Vesuviano; 9% in Nola; 5% in  Palma Campania 
and 3% in Marigliano, Naples and Lauro. 
   
Communications a. Railways 
The Thomas Cook & Son’s Vesuvius Railway was badly affected 
and not fully restored until 1909 (see Table 1 footnote 1). Other 
railways were affected less severely and were soon restored. For 
instance, the circum-Vesuvian railway was cut in several places 
(Anon, 1906g) - at Boscotrecase by lava and elsewhere by air 
fall, as was railway along the coast (Delmé-Radcliffe, 1906, pp. 7 
see Fig. 3). Following the eruption, some railway bridges were 
destroyed by lahars 
b. Roads 
Roads were covered by ash/lapilli and near Boscotrecase by lava. 
Several bridges failed, both during the eruption and subsequent 
laharic activity.    
c. Telecommunications 
Ottaviano, San Giuseppe, Terzigno and some other settlements 
lost their telegraph inks for a short time, but these were soon 
restored. Links to the observatory were cut, but quickly restored 
my military engineers (Ricciardi, 2009, pp. 732-733). Most of the 
telegraph lines remained intact.   
 
The authorities made a great and generally successful effort to 
restore communications (see section 5.2). 
 
1
 Information based on an interview with Assessore Gennaro Ambrosio in the 
the comune of San Giuseppe Vesuviano on 10/9/04.  
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Table 3 
Theodicy is defined as any attempt to reconcile the idea of a loving God with the 
existence of suffering in the world, and in the popular Catholicism of the Italian 
south this is expressed in three ways:- 
a. Disasters have to be accepted as justified expressions of divine anger with a 
sinful people. 
b. People can appease God’s wrath by actions which involve the use of images, 
effigies and relics of saints and the Madonna. 
c. Intercession to saintly supernatural figures have the power to change God’s 
mind through intercessory prayer.  
 
Orthodox Catholic theology holds that Christ and God are co-equal, and the Virgin 
Mary and the saints are mortals and possess no power of their own to change the 
divine mind. Saints can only intercede through the agency of Jesus Christ.  
Southern Italian popular Catholicism is, however,  heteordox ‘Christ is more 
powerful than God the Father, Mary is more powerful than Christ; and Saint 
Joseph, the universal father, is more powerful than God the Father, Christ and he 
Madonna together. But more powerful than God and all the saints is the one saint 
that – from as far back as…. the Middle Ages – the inhabitants of a given place 
have selected as their patron’ (Carroll, 1992, pp. 15-16). 
 
Under the influence of the European Enlightenment in the 18
th
 century, other 
models of theodicy became more important, in particular the view that the world is 
‘best of all possible worlds’ that could be created by God, disasters representing 
the operation of extreme natural processes. Southern Italy Catholicism remained 
wedded to ideas of divine wrath and punishment…., although the ‘greater good’ 
may be found in Christian praxis where such qualities as self-sacrifice, cohesion of 
family and community are expressed in Catholic social action.  
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Table 4 
Date Military Action 
Friday 6
th
  1000 troops and 10 wagons were sent from Naples to Torre 
Annunziata. The General Officer commanding in Salarno (a major 
city to the south of the region) was ordered to transfer his 
headquarters to Nocera to be nearer Vesuvius. Although some initial 
efforts were made at Boscotrecase (1906b), it was quickly concluded 
that it was futile to either divert lava or to provide protection against 
ash or lapilli were futile.    
Saturday 7
th
 A company of engineers and further 100 infantry and 10 wagons were 
sent to each of the villages of Torre del Greco and Portici.  
Sunday 8
th
  From dawn there was a rapid reaction to the explosive activity that 
occurred during the night of the 7
th
/8
th
 (Table 1). The Duca d’Aosta, 
commanding the Xth Army Corps, fearing that activity would become 
even more violent, issued orders for the volcano to be surrounded by 
a ‘cordon ‘of troops, better to support the civil power. The whole 
region was divided into ‘zones’ under the command of either a 
colonel, or in some cases a Major General, and supplies were moved 
to these forward bases.  The ‘cordon’ was divided into two Divisional 
Commands, one at Naples and the other at Nocera, with Brigade-sized 
units being located at Torre Annuziata and Ottaviano.  
Monday 9
th
 
and 
subsequently 
As it became clear that needs were greater in some areas than in 
others, ‘sub-zones’ were created at: Portici; Resina; San Giorgio a 
Cremona and Terzigno. San Giuseppe and San Gennaro were 
reinforced. To the rear of the ‘cordon’, a second line was established 
with command posts at Marigliano, Nola, Nocera, Palma and 
Poggiomarino.  Major supply depots at Naples, Nola and Nocera 
supplied rations to the various ‘zones’ and ‘sub-zones’, and troops 
cooked food when and where it was required. The Sindaco or 
commissioner of each comune issued a tally to those requiring food. 
As well as supplying, distributing and in some cases cooking food, 
troops were also involved in clearing ash from roofs, transporting the 
injured to hospital, removing/storing furniture and other effects and 
restoring communications. The railway line from Naples to Ottaviano 
was, for instance, re-opened by April 15
th
. Soldiers continued to dig 
through the ash to find any survivors and recover bodies, Colonel 
Delmé-Radcliffe noting that one 80 year old man was saved after 
being buried for five day. 
The number of troops in the inner cordon was ca. 7,000 with 200 
wagons, with some 4,000 soldiers, 1,000 sailors and a further 60 
wagons being held further back in reserve. Armed troops were also 
stationed in Naples in case of any breakdown in law and order. Later 
in the eruption troops in the ‘cordon’ were rotated with 
reinforcements brought in from Rome, who arrived with more 
equipment comprising 50 wagons, over 4,000 shovels, nearly 3,000 
pickaxes and 660 sledge-hammers. The army also requisitioned local 
transport and many pack animals in order to distribute food. 
 
The French and British send naval personnel to the Bay of Naples, but 
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in the event these forces were not required (Anon 1906n). 
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Table 5  
 
Settlement Population 1901 Change 1901-1911 
(%) 
Change 1911-21 
(%) 
Naples Province 1.25 million 13.7 12.2 
Naples comune 621,213 20.9 14.4 
    
Sant’ Anastasia 8,712 3.9 8.9 
Somma Vesuviana 10,090 4.8 6.0 
Nola 14,511 2.0 7.1 
Ottaviano 8,533 2.7 20.4 
San Gennaro 3,575 -2.5 6.4 
San Giuseppe 10,063 8.1 21.9 
    
Boscotrecase 6,286 8.9 18.3 
    
Lauro 2,945 0.9 -1.7 
Scisciano 2,546 -3.1 5.2 
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Highlights 
Human impact of the 1906 eruption reconstructed using archival sources 
Eruption successfully handled by a combination of traditional (local) and State-based 
responses. 
Responses 
Effective short-term recovery 
Slow long-term recovery 
